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II. Executive Summary 
 
 
Directly following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States government 
initiated a self study to determine how it could better prevent, prepare for, and respond to 
terrorist attacks within its boarders.  After only a short time, the public policy response 
began to occur.  Many bills were introduced into the House and the Senate aimed at 
correcting the problems that were identified involving homeland security. The main 
question that this research attempts to address is if the United States government’s public 
policy response, through public laws, was adequate and appropriate to address the threat 
of a terrorist attack on the United States involving nuclear weapons.  
The first portion of the research focuses on the threat of nuclear terrorism and the 
outcome of an attack on the United States, as well as the most likely origins of an attack. 
The research indicates that a terrorist organization would most likely acquire a nuclear 
weapon or material from the former Soviet Union, Pakistan, Iran or North Korea.  The 
countries that once made up the Soviet Union have the largest stockpile of nuclear 
weapons or materials; however Pakistan or Iran would be far more sympathetic to the 
cause of a terrorist organization. North Korea provides its own unique direct threat to the 
security of the United States.  The research has indicated that the most likely method, as 
well as the most lightly protected, of transportation for a weapon or materials is through 
containerized cargo entering into the United States through one of its 361 seaports. In 
addition, the research indicated that a nuclear attack on a major metropolitan area, such as 
Washington DC, would be devastating in terms of loss of life and economic 
consequences.  
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The second portion of the research focuses on the policy responses and public laws 
that have been adopted since 9/11 to address the threat of nuclear terrorism. A 
comprehensive directory of the public laws enacted from September 11, 2001 until 
January 1, 2005 dealing with nuclear terrorism was created.  The directory was generated 
by searching by subject and date using THOMAS and identifying listings in the 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac index. The research identified thirty-seven public laws 
that were passed from September 11, 2001 until January 1, 2005. After further analysis, 
eight were examined in detail.  
• USA Patriot Act Of 2001 
• The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 
• Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002 
• Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 
• The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 
• The Homeland Security Act of 2002 
• Project BioShield Act of 2004 
• Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
 
The third phase of the research was an examination of the public laws themselves. 
The public laws were systematically analyzed to determine if they were appropriate, 
reasonable, and relevant to threat of nuclear terrorism based on three separate factors. 
These factors included prevention and deterrence, protection, and response.  
 
Several key points were identified as a result of the research: 
 
• The public laws that were adopted since September 11, 2001 are reactive rather 
than proactive in nature. 
  
• The research did not identify any significant measures that were adopted since 
September 11, 2001 to deter or prevent nuclear terrorism. However, several public 
laws did contain provisions that dealt with response to a nuclear attack. 
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• The public laws that were adopted since September 11, 2001 are extremely vague 
in defining many of the country’s homeland security strategies. 
 
• In some cases, the public laws that were adopted since September 11, 2001 add 
additional layers to the bureaucracy surrounding homeland security, thus further 
complicating many of the problems identified since the attacks.  
 
• While the public laws that were adopted since September 11, 2001 make progress 
in securing the nation’s borders and ports by providing additional resources and 
personnel, weak security practices are still evident at many of these facilities. 
 
• In some instances, the funding for various missions was limited and was not 
sufficient to accomplish specific goals and objectives.  
 
• Technologically advanced screening capabilities used to detect radioactive or 
nuclear materials either in ports at home or abroad are costly and limited in scope. 
In addition, the US government must engage in negotiations with foreign 
governments before the technologies can be installed which is sometimes 
ineffective.  
 
• There have not been any public laws passed since September 11, 2001 
specifically tasked with securing air cargo transported throughout the civil 
aviation system of the United States. 
 
• The Nunn – Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which has been 
effective in dealing with Russian proliferation issues, has had its funding reduced 
in the years following September 11, 2001. 
 
• A layered approach to homeland security should be adopted and better utilized in 
order to secure the United States from attacks involving nuclear weapons and 
materials originating from outside its boarders.   
 
The evidence obtained through this research indicates that the United States 
government’s public policy response, through public laws, was not adequate and 
appropriate to address the threat of a terrorist attack on the United States involving 
nuclear weapons.  While the public laws did not incorporate many provisions that served 
as a deterrence to an attack or protection from an attack, the public laws did vaguely 
address the response to an attack involving nuclear weapons. The United States 
government has failed to address the threat of nuclear terrorism. 
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III. Introduction 
Many challenges exist involving the United States’ counterterrorism policy.  The 
events of 9/11 have demonstrated vulnerabilities in the country’s counterterrorism 
operations and policies.  The 9/11 Commission, as well as the other commissions, have 
conducted in-depth analyses of the pre-9/11 environment and have recommended the 
implementation of various types of policy to better address the security needs of the 
United States regarding terrorism. Of the recommendations that have been made, many 
are being implemented slowly, if at all. While it is evident that the United States is taking 
steps to address its security needs, it is not clear if the policies systematically address the 
threats and vulnerabilities identified since 9/11. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
suggesting that these policies are effective. Recent analysis suggests that there are 
significant flaws within various aspects of homeland security. 
The attacks of 9/11 demonstrated that the United States was vulnerable to outside 
terrorist threats. In the months following the disaster, the United States government took 
very serious action to identify and neutralize the vulnerabilities that existed to its national 
security. Members of Congress and the President created the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, on 
November 27, 20021 to determine where the vulnerabilities were and what actions should 
be taken to address them.  The 9/11 Commission concluded, after more than eighteen 
months of investigation, that the institutions that were charged with protecting our 
borders, civil aviation, and national security did not understand how grave the threat of 
terrorism could be and, therefore, had not adjusted their policies, plans, and practices to 
                                                 
1 “The 9/11 Commission Report.”  W.W. Norton & Company.  New York. 2004. pg. xvi 
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deter it.2  The 9/11 Commission made forty-one recommendations for policy to Congress 
and the President as a result of its investigation.  The recommendations encompassed a 
broad range of issues.   
Other commissions, groups, and individuals have made recommendations 
regarding terrorism.  The Gilmore Commission which released its final report on 
December 15, 2003, acknowledged that progress has been made; however, more still 
remains to be done. Some of its key recommendations include: a consistent commitment 
of resources to respond to and recover from a full range of threats, a standardized process 
to share information and intelligence, strong levels of preparedness and readiness across 
state, local, and private sectors, better engagement of the academic, business, and 
government communities for rapidly developing, and implementing research and 
development standards, and finally, protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure.3  
The Hart Rudman Commission’s final report also addressed vulnerabilities 
regarding terrorism.  The final report was issued on January 31, 2001.  The intention of 
the commission was to make recommendations that addressed the post Cold War security 
environment. The commission suggested that the federal government must ensure the 
security of the American homeland, recapitalize America’s strengths in science and 
education, redesign key institutions of the Executive Branch, overhaul the U.S. 
government personnel system, and reorganize Congress’s role in national security 
affairs.4 Both the Gilmore Commission and the Hart Rubman Commission revealed 
problems in the United States counterterrorism policy before the 9/11 attacks. 
                                                 
2 Ibid 
3 “The Gilmore Commission Final Report.”  Washington, DC. 2003. 
4 “The Hart Rubman Commission Final Report.”  Washington, DC. 2001. 
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Several programs and initiatives were implemented before September 11, 2001 to 
deal with proliferation issues. These programs have had great success in limiting 
proliferation risks with minimal costs. The Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program, which has been effective in dealing with Russian proliferation issues, was 
created in 1991. To date, the Nunn – Lugar initiative has deactivated or destroyed: 6,760 
nuclear warheads, 587 ICBMs, 483 ICBM silos, 32 ICBM mobile missile launchers, 150 
bombers, 789 nuclear air-to-surface missiles, 436 submarine missile launchers, 549 
submarine launched missiles, 28 nuclear submarines, and 194 nuclear test tunnels.5  The 
success rate of the initiative, as well as its low costs, makes it an ideal and useful tool in 
the Global War on Terror.   
The purpose of this research is to determine if the United States government’s 
policy responses have been adequate and appropriate to the national security threats that 
have been identified since the 9/11 attacks. Specifically, I have investigated the threats 
that have been revealed as a result of the self-study by the United States government, 
which was implemented due to the attacks on September 11, 2001.  I then identified and 
categorized the public laws and policy changes that were made as a result of the self-
study. Finally, I systematically tested whether the policy response was appropriate, 
reasonable, and relevant to the threat of nuclear terrorism.  
The evidence suggests that there is significant room for improvement in the 
counterterrorism practices of the United States government.  In addition, there has not 
been a comprehensive examination of the policy response to 9/11. It will take a great deal 
of cooperation and funding to accomplish these broader goals.  It is therefore imperative 
                                                 
5 Nunn-Lugar Report.  August 2005.  Available at: http://lugar.senate.gov/reports/Nunn-
Lugar_Report_2005.pdf 
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that a careful analysis of the types of threats and vulnerabilities be done in order to use 
scarce government resources more effectively and efficiently to secure United States 
from further terrorist attacks.  
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IV. Literature Review 
In a recently released report by 9/11 Public Discourse Project, formally known as 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Chairman Thomas H. 
Kean and Vice Chair Lee H. Hamilton released a prepared statement. In the statement 
they argued, “It is scandalous that we still allocate homeland security dollars on the basis 
of pork barrel spending, not risk.”6  This statement, as well as their final report, identifies 
significant gaps in homeland security. The report concluded that “Congress has still not 
changed the underlying statutory authority for homeland security grants, or benchmarks 
to insure that funds are used wisely. As a result, homeland security funds continue to be 
distributed without regard for risk, vulnerability, or the consequences of an attack, 
diluting the national security benefits of this important program.”7  
Of the forty-one recommendations that the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States released in their final report on July 22, 2004, only 
thirteen are considered to be adequately addressed. The federal government is not moving 
as fast as it had indicated it would in regard to the recommendations.  On July 23, 2004, 
House Speaker Dennis Hastert and House Majority Leader Tom DeLay assured 
Americans that the House of Representatives would "immediately assess everything we 
have done in this regard since 9/11 and everything more we need to do."8  They went on 
to say in a joint statement that "We have therefore directed our appropriate committees to 
examine the commission's recommendations, begin hearings in August, and report back 
                                                 
6 Kean, Thomas.  “Prepared statement on the Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations.”  December 5, 2005. 
7   “Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations.”  2005. 
8 Bash, Dana. “White House forms task force to study 9/11 findings.” 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/07/23/911.congress/index.html.  Accessed December 22, 2005.  
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to us with recommendations for specific legislation in September including specific 
proposals that we will consider before Congress adjourns."9  Each said that they hoped to 
have a bill drafted by October 1, 2004. 10  
Additionally, vulnerabilities remain domestically while an aggressive war is 
waged on terrorists abroad. Stephen E. Flynn, a Senior Fellow in National Security 
Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations argues that “the Bush administration has 
waged an aggressive war against terrorists abroad, but it has neglected to protect the 
homeland, even though Americans in the United States are the ones most vulnerable to 
future attacks.” 11  Specific vulnerabilities include lax security at chemical facilities, 
limited security for mass transit and sea ports, an unprotected infrastructure, and porous 
boarders. 
While homeland security spending has more than doubled since 9/11, analysis 
suggests that the funds are not being spent or allocated wisely.  In the recent paper What 
Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?, Veronique de Rugy argues that “homeland 
security spending was increased by roughly 200 percent since FY2001.”12 Not 
surprisingly, very little was spent before September 11, 2001 on homeland security 
related activities. An estimate shows that spending increased slightly from approximately 
$9 billion or .5% of the total budget of $1,516 billon in FY199513 to approximately $13 
                                                 
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid 
11 Flynn, Stephen E. “The Neglected Home Front.”  Foreign Affairs, September/October 2004. 
12 De Rugy, Veronica. “What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Washington, DC. 2004. Page 1. 
13 “Historical Tables of the Budget of the United States, FY2005.” Available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/pdf/hist.pdf. Accessed: December 10, 2005. 
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billion or .7% of the total budget of $1,789 billion in FY200014.  The dramatic increase in 
spending occurred from 2001 to the present. Spending increased from $16.9 billion or 1% 
of the total budget of $1,864 billon in FY200115 to more than $49.9 billion (estimate) or 
.5% of the estimated budget of $1,516 billon in FY2006.  This equates to approximately a 
195 percent increase over that period. Trends show that growth will likely continue. 
However, most homeland security funding is allocated on a political basis rather than a 
sound cost-benefit analysis. For example, the FY 2004 Homeland Security spending bill 
allocated $2,000,000 to the Great Lakes Region to purchase an Icebreaker so that 
commercial ships can travel through the lakes during the winter months.16  In addition, 
according to the Citizens Against Government Waste, the FY 2004 Homeland Security 
spending bill contained 18 wasteful items amounting to $423 million.17  De Rugy 
concludes that much of the new spending will not result in sound security.18 As a result, 
homeland security funding is likely to be misallocated, resulting in a less than optimal 
level of security in America.19   
In addition to the difficulty associated with the method in which funds are 
allocated, the political interests of some politicians have become as important as the 
security needs of the United States. Richard Falkenrath, a fellow at the Brookings 
Institution and a CNN security analyst, suggests that the recommendation by the 9/11 
Commission to distribute federal homeland security grants based on risk, rather than a 
                                                 
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid 
16 De Rugy, Veronica. “What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Washington, DC. 2004. Page 32.
17 Citizens Against Government Waste, Pig Book, April 8, 2004. 
18 De Rugy, Veronica. “What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Washington, DC. 2004. Page 1 
19 Ibid 
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politically derived formula, is not being fully implemented. He argues that this is because 
a handful of small-state senators in key positions do not want to allow a reduction in 
federal resources to their constituents.20  Currently, funding is not distributed on per 
capita basis; therefore, small states such as Rhode Island receive more funding for 
homeland security per capita than larger more populated states, such as Pennsylvania. 
Data from the FY2004 Homeland Security Grant program shows that the state of Rhode 
Island, which is small and contains very few high value targets, received approximately 
$20.00 per capita.21  New York, having a larger population and land mass as well as 
many more high value targets, received only $5.41 per capita during the same time 
frame.22  
Brian D. Finlay is a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center in 
Washington, D.C., where he specializes on issues of nuclear and biological non-
proliferation and threat reduction.  Finlay concludes that there are currently enough 
weapons grade materials in Russia that are vulnerable to theft to make numerous 
weapons.   He goes on to argue that Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have 
stated their intent to acquire a nuclear device.  Therefore, the weapons grade materials 
that are located in the former Soviet Union are an available and an inviting target for 
criminal organizations.  Finlay has concluded that the United States government has 
made discrete but noteworthy progress in securing vulnerable weapons, expertise, and 
                                                 
20 Falkenrath, Richard A.  Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.  
April 27, 2005. 
21 De Rugy, Veronica. “What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Washington, DC. 2004. Page 17. 
22 Ibid. 
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materials in Russia. In addition, Finlay argues that the United States has taken steps to 
strengthen the global capacity for identifying and intercepting shipments of WMD.  
 However, he argues that, overall, the Bush Administration and Congress have 
neither achieved nor made substantial progress with most of the strategic objectives 
identified by the bipartisan task force that was lead by Senator Howard Baker in 2001. Of 
the nineteen measures, only five have seen progress toward implementation.  The task 
force concluded that “the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States 
today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in 
Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against 
American troops abroad or citizens at home.”23 Finlay concludes, in his report, that “the 
proven cost-effectiveness of threat reduction programs, combined with the urgency of the 
threat, makes it imperative that the United States government overcome the necessary 
obstacles to accelerate the programs.”  
According to the Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses published 
in June of 2005, the possibility of an attack on the United States using nuclear weapons 
or any other weapon of mass destruction is increasing.  “The median estimate of the risk 
of a nuclear attack during the next 5 years was 10%. The average estimate was 16.4%.”24  
The risk associated with an attack more than doubled if the time frame was increased to 
ten years.  Furthermore, a strong consensus indicates that if a nuclear attack does occur, 
more experts believe that it will be done by a terrorist group, not a state actor. 
“Underscoring the need to safeguard and account for all nuclear weapons and material, 
                                                 
23 The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, United States Department of Energy, A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s 
Nonproliferation Programs with Russia, p.iii (January 2001), available at http://www.stimson.org/ctr/?SN=CT20050720884 
hereinafter “Baker-Cutler Task Force.”] 
24 Lugar, Richard. “The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses.” US Senate. June 2005. Page 14. 
Avialable at: http://lugar.senate.gov/reports/NPSurvey.pdf 
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almost 79% of respondents (67 of 85) said that if a nuclear attack occurs during the next 
ten years, it is more likely to be carried out by a terrorist group than by a government.”25
Additionally, the survey attempted to determine the most likely method of 
acquisition for a terrorist organization to acquire nuclear materials or weapons.  
According to the survey, a black market purchase was the most likely means through 
which terrorists would acquire nuclear weapons or weapons grade material.  About three 
quarters (63 of 83) of respondents selected “black market purchase” either exclusively or 
in combination with one of the other responses. The probability that a current nuclear 
weapons state might deliberately transfer nuclear weapons or materials directly to a 
terrorist organization was seen as the least likely method or approximately less than 10%. 
This analysis indicates that the likelihood of nuclear attack is greater now than it has been 
in the past and that there is greater likelihood that a terrorist organization will acquire the 
weapons through theft. This is significant because if a terrorist organization were to 
acquire a nuclear weapon or nuclear material the likelihood that they would use it against 
a target in United States is significant.  
The literature review indicates that the pre-9/11 security environment was 
inadequate to defend against the emerging terrorist threats. Furthermore, several 
government studies have indicated the need for improved security practices and often 
have recommended several key changes.  One author has argued that the United States 
has waged an aggressive war abroad, while neglecting the home front. The literature 
review also indicates that much vulnerability still exists in the United States well after the 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  In addition, the literature suggests that funds are not 
                                                 
25 Ibid. page 15 
 
 18
allocated by a risk based analysis but rather by what some would call a politically derived 
formula.  The literature also suggests that the most likely source for nuclear materials or 
weapons is n the countries that once made up the Soviet Union. Additionally, the 
likelihood of an attack involving a terrorist organization and a nuclear weapon has 
increased over the last ten years and will increase in the years to come.  In conclusion, the 
United State’s homeland security practices are deficient in some areas, including 
protection from an attack involving nuclear weapons.  The countries of the former Soviet 
Union, as well as North Korea, Iran and Pakistan are all likely places for a terror 
organization to gain the necessary materials or weapons for such an attack. The loss of 
human life and the economic implications from a terrorist attack using nuclear weapons 
would be disastrous. 
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V. Methodology 
The first portion of my research discusses the threat of nuclear terrorism and the 
outcome of an attack on the United States.  I first describe the threat of nuclear terrorism 
and briefly discuss proliferation issues.  Specifically, the research presents evidence of 
the ambitions of Al Qaeda and its leadership to acquire weapons of mass destruction, 
particularly nuclear weapons.  In addition, the research discusses the possible origins of 
nuclear fissile materials or nuclear weapons.  In particular, the research discusses the 
countries of the former Soviet Union, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan.  However, the 
main focus of this portion of the analysis is on the former Soviet Union because of its 
vast terrain, high numbers of weapons facilities, and a limited security budget. 
Furthermore, the research examines the possibility of a terrorist or a terrorist organization 
smuggling nuclear materials or a nuclear device into the United States.  This section of 
research concludes with the discussion of several scenarios of attack involving nuclear 
weapons on the Washington DC metro area. The first portion of research focuses on the 
description of the threat, the individuals or organizations most likely to carry out an 
attack, the acquisition of material that are necessary for an attack, the transportation of 
the materials, and finally the attack itself.  
The second portion of the research focuses on the policy responses and public 
laws that have been adopted since 9/11 to address the threat of nuclear terrorism. A 
comprehensive directory of the public laws enacted from September 11, 2001 until 
January 1, 2005 dealing with nuclear terrorism was created.  The directory was generated 
by searching by subject and date using THOMAS and identifying listings in the 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac index.  THOMAS is the Library of Congress’s 
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legislative database. According to THOMAS, subject terms were created by legislative 
analysts from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress. 
Analysts closely examine the content of each bill and resolution and assign (index) as 
many subject terms as are required to describe the measure's substance and effects. Terms 
appearing in the subjects display come from a list that is based upon the CRS Legislative 
Indexing Vocabulary (LIV), a thesaurus developed to classify public policy subject 
matter.  The terms that were used in the identification process were nuclear weapons, 
nuclear terrorism, and nuclear proliferation. The Congressional Quarterly Almanac index 
was also used as a search mechanism for additional public laws that may not have been 
identified by the earlier analysis. The terms homeland security, terrorism, and nuclear 
weapons were used for this portion of the analysis. The policy responses to nuclear 
terrorism were then categorized according to the Congress that passed the measures and 
then by the year the measures were enacted.  
The third phase of the research was an examination of the public laws themselves. 
I systematically analyzed the public laws that were identified to determine if they were 
appropriate, reasonable, and relevant to threat of nuclear terrorism by three separate 
factors. I first examined the law to determine if preventative in nature. Prevention is 
defined as the detection, deterrence, or mitigation of threats to the United States. The 
second factor that I used to examine the law was based on its protective qualities.  
Protection is defined as the safeguarding of the citizens critical infrastructure, property 
and the economy of the United States from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other 
emergencies. The third criteria I used for examining the laws were the measures that dealt 
with the response to an attack or an event.  Response is defined as the management and 
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coordination of a national response to acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other 
emergencies. Finally, I described any other benefits that were gained from the passage of 
the law. These four criteria were chosen because they are included in the strategic goals 
of the Department of Homeland Security.  In conclusion, the goal of this research is to 
determine, by examining those four criteria, if the United States government’s policy 
responses have been adequate and appropriate to the national security threat of nuclear 
terrorism that has been identified since the 9/11 attacks.  
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VI. The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism   
The most urgent and unmet national security threat to the United States today is 
the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could 
be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops 
abroad or citizens at home.26  While there are many possible methods of attack, nuclear 
weapons pose one of the gravest threats to the national security of the United States. An 
attack involving a nuclear weapon would create an un-measurable economic impact as 
well as a considerable loss of life. Evidence suggests that Al Qaeda is both capable and 
willing to use nuclear weapons against the United States.  This threat will most likely 
originate from materials or a device obtained from the former Soviet Union, Pakistan, 
Iran, or North Korea.   
Plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) are the main components of any 
nuclear device.  The plutonium and HEU in the U.S. weapons stockpile is subject to strict 
controls and high standards of accounting.  However, other countries that possess nuclear 
weapons or materials have not placed the same emphasis on securing their weapons and 
materials. This is where the real problem lies. It is in these areas that the theft or sale of 
nuclear materials or weapons is most likely to occur. While security has been 
substantially improved since the Soviet collapse, nuclear security budgets remain 
inadequate to effectively provide security for nuclear sites in the former Soviet Union.  In 
addition, states like Pakistan and India may also be willing to provide nuclear materials 
or devices to individuals or groups with whom they are sympathetic.   
                                                 
26 The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, United States Department of Energy, A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s 
Nonproliferation Programs with Russia, p.iii (January 2001), available at http://www.stimson.org/ctr/?SN=CT20050720884 
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Furthermore, evidence suggests that the security practices that the United States 
has implemented to prevent or deter such items from passing through its borders are 
minimal at best.  In addition, a nuclear attack on a major US metropolitan area could 
cause more than 150,000 fatalities.  In summation, evidence suggests a well-organized 
and well-financed group, such as Al Qaeda, would be able to construct a crude nuclear 
explosive if they were able to acquire the needed material, and had the time and resources 
to devote to the task.  Without question, Al Qaeda or one of its affiliates would be willing 
to use an improvised nuclear device to attack the United States or American interests 
abroad if it were able to acquire such a weapon. 
 
Al Qaeda’s ambitions for nuclear weapons and materials 
Evidence suggests that Al Qaeda is actively seeking nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction.  With thousands of new Al Qaeda recruits, new fields of 
operation, a destabilized Middle East and weakened alliances, the danger that a terrorist 
group could get a nuclear weapon from one of the poorly guarded warehouses in Russia 
or from a sympathetic military commander in Pakistan or any other sympathetic country 
has never been greater.27  
Al Qaeda has the motivation, financial means, and physical security to pursue an 
acquisition program to gain nuclear materials.28 In December 1998, Osama bin Laden, 
who that summer had orchestrated attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 
declared it a “religious duty” to acquire nuclear weapons and threaten the United States 
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or its interests.29  Al Qaeda took a two prong approach to acquiring nuclear weapons and 
materials.  First, in Sudan during the mid-1990s, Al Qaeda tried to obtain nuclear 
materials that could be used to make a weapon.30 Fortunately, Al Qaeda was unable to 
obtain the necessary materials because they fell victim to scams involving different types 
of radiological waste, such as the use of Red Mercury.  Second, while in Afghanistan and 
under the protection of the Taliban, Al Qaeda began a more ambitious acquisition effort 
that included consultations with Pakistani civilian nuclear scientists.31  Evidence also 
suggests that Al Qaeda may have attempted to purchase weapons (including so-called 
suitcase nukes) from Russia and elsewhere.32  Following extensive analysis of open 
source information and interviews with knowledgeable officials in February of 2002, the 
Institute for Science and International Security found no credible evidence that either bin 
Laden or Al Qaeda possesses nuclear weapons or sufficient fissile material to make 
them.33  However, if Al Qaeda obtained enough plutonium or highly enriched uranium, 
the Institute for Science and International Security believes they are capable of building a 
crude nuclear explosive, despite several difficult steps.34  
Additionally, the United States conducted its own anyslsis of Al Qaeda’s nuclear 
weapons capabilities through the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the 
United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.  The commission presented its 
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report in March of 2005.  It stated that in October 2001, the U.S. intelligence community 
assessed that Al Qaeda was capable of fabricating at least a "crude" nuclear device if it 
could obtain the requisite nuclear material, which is separated plutonium or HEU.35  The 
commission also reported that the CIA’s Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and 
Arms Control (WINPAC) Center and its Counterterrorist Center judged in November 
2001 that Al Qaeda "probably had access to nuclear expertise and facilities and that there 
was a real possibility of the group developing a crude nuclear device."36  The commission 
also emphasized that the documents seized from Al Qaeda safe houses in Afghanistan 
after the overthrow of the Taliban "brought to light detailed and revealing information 
about the direction and progress of Al Qaeda radiological and nuclear ambitions," which 
had not been available when those earlier judgments were made.37  Therefore, it seems 
clear that Al Qaeda was actively pursuing the production or acquisition of at least one 
nuclear weapon.  As a result, it is likely that once nuclear weapons are acquired, Al 
Qaeda or one of its affiliates will be willing to use them against a target within the United 
States.  
 
Typical origins of unsecured nuclear weapons and materials 
The problem of unsecured nuclear weapons and materials was believed to be tied 
mainly to the former Soviet Union.  Although in recent years, Pakistan, Iran, and North 
Korea have also come to pose a significant threat as well. Effective control over 
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plutonium and HEU is fundamental to the entire global effort to stop the spread of 
nuclear weapons to hostile states and terrorist groups.38  It is paramount to keep nuclear 
materials out of the hands of non-state actors such as terrorist organizations, as well as, 
other aggressive, less developed states. Therefore, limiting access to plutonium and HEU 
is the primary technical barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons. Even small amounts of 
HEU are a risk.  Most countries, even some terrorist organizations, could build at least a 
crude nuclear bomb capable of obliterating the downtown area of a major metropolitan 
area if they had sufficient materials in their possession.39  As was previously stated, a 
crude device would require approximately four kilograms of plutonium and is capable of 
leveling several city blocks, as well as, inflicting mass casualties.   
The threat of nuclear terrorism is both real and credible. There have already been 
multiple seizures, by authorities in Russia and elsewhere, of several kilogram quantities 
of stolen weapons-usable uranium, and one seizure of hundreds of grams of weapons-
usable plutonium.40  The seizures of weapons-useable nuclear material are limited; 
however, they pose a significant risk. The nuclear trafficking database maintained by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency includes 18 confirmed cases of seizure of at least 
small quantities of HEU and plutonium since 1993.41   
Typically when discussing the problem of loose nukes or unsecured nuclear 
materials, the countries that were once the Soviet Union pose a threat to the security of 
the United States. “Many of the Russian nuclear sites remain vulnerable to insiders 
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determined to steal enough existing material to make several nuclear weapons and to 
transport these materials” to unstable regimes or terrorists.42  In nearly all of the cases of 
nuclear trafficking recorded by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the seizure took 
place either within the Soviet Union or on its periphery, with reason to believe that the 
material originated within the former Soviet Union.43   
Russia is estimated to have roughly 170 metric tons of weapons-usable separated 
plutonium (counting both military and civilian stockpiles) and over 900 tons of HEU.44  
According to common calculations, four kilograms of plutonium and roughly three times 
that amount of HEU is enough materials for a nuclear device. The stockpiles of fissile 
material that currently exist in Russia would be enough material for over 100,000 nuclear 
bombs.45  In addition, the U.S. Department of Energy has estimated that approximately 
600 tons of weapons-usable separated plutonium and HEU is not currently incorporated 
into existing nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union.46  Simply put, the HEU is 
“loose” and is available for use. This nuclear material is located and stored in an 
estimated 252 buildings, at 53 sites, spread across 11 time zones throughout Russia.47  
With limited budgets and personnel, adequately securing these materials proves to be a 
daunting task. All of the nuclear weapons that were produced for the former Soviet Union 
are now in Russia, as is some 99% of the weapons-usable material, but civilian facilities 
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in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan also have quantities large 
enough to pose proliferation risks.48
Funding issues contribute to the lack of security at storage facilities across the 
former Soviet Union.  Several problems exist with the management of nuclear weapons 
and materials in the former Soviet Union, which poses threats to international security.  
First, nuclear weapons and materials stockpiles are not secure and poorly accounted for in 
the former Soviet Union.49  In addition, if nuclear weapons or materials are stolen, the 
procedures in place to find and recover them, or to hinder smuggling across borders, are 
inadequate at best.50  For example, custodians at nuclear stockpile facilities face low pay 
and the prospect of mass layoffs, and are often in an under-funded and oversized nuclear 
complex.51  Furthermore, the management of nuclear stockpiles remains shrouded in 
secrecy, making a clear understanding of the problems and effective implementation of 
solutions far more difficult.52  Finally, more weapons-usable material continues to be 
produced and the stockpile of nuclear weapons and materials that now exists is far larger 
than is needed for military purposes.53  This final factor greatly inhibits or slows the 
progress that has been made in reducing nuclear weapons and materials in the former 
Soviet Union.  
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 According to a May 2005 report by Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier of Harvard 
University’s Managing the Atom project, there continues to be “guards patrolling without 
ammunition in their guns, workers propping open security doors for convenience and 
guards turning off intrusion detectors when they become annoyed by the false alarms.”54 
A legitimate and credible threat exists. According to Matt Bunn in Preventing a Nuclear 
9-11, “Russian officials confirm that terrorist teams have actually carried out 
reconnaissance at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites.”55  In addition to terrorists, 
ordinary individuals have attempted to make money off of loosely guarded nuclear 
materials.  On October 14, 2003, two residents of the Russian town of Sarov were 
convicted of falsely posing as employees of an unidentified nuclear facility and offering 
to sell a Russian businessman stolen weapons-grade plutonium for $750,000 to sell to a 
foreign client.56  The CIA’s National Intelligence Council reported to Congress in 
December 2004 that the security of nuclear stockpiles in Russia has been “slowly 
improving,” although many “risks remain.”57  Even more troubling, the report concluded 
that it was “highly unlikely that Russian authorities would have been able to recover all 
the material that was reportedly stolen” and judged that “undetected nuclear smuggling 
has occurred.”58  Evidence suggests that vast amounts of nuclear materials and weapons 
remain in Russia, as well as, parts of the former Soviet Union.  Additionally, these 
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materials and weapons are often poorly secured and the accounting practices that keep 
track of materials are often flawed.  More so, if a theft was detected, it is unlikely that 
Russian authorities would be able to recover the missing materials in a timely fashion, if 
at all. 
Countries that made up the former Soviet Union are not the only locations that 
nuclear weapons and materials are easy to obtain.  Iran has re-instated its nuclear 
program against strong recommendations by the western nations, as well as the United 
Nations, to keep the program in moth balls.  Because Iran retains a highly secretive 
government and has never been under the level of intense international inspection that 
Iraq faced, information about its procurement efforts is even more fragmentary.59 
However, the available information suggests that Iran also has sought to purchase stolen 
nuclear material from other nations and organizations.60  During 2003 and 2004, a series 
of IAEA reports documented Iran’s decades-long secret effort to develop uranium 
enrichment, as well as other key technologies for producing potential nuclear weapons 
materials.61  More progress has been made in their nuclear program than was originally 
noted.  Iran built a substantial illicit procurement network to acquire technologies related 
to weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles all over the world, but in particular 
in the former Soviet Union.62  While it is now clear that the most critical technologies for 
Iran's indigenous efforts to produce nuclear material were coming from the black-market 
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nuclear network led by Pakistan's A.Q. Khan, not from Russia, Iran's nuclear connections 
to the former Soviet Union are strong, and there is significant evidence of ongoing efforts 
to acquire stolen nuclear material.63  As with terror organizations, Iran also sought 
Russian nuclear material, although the technology needed for their program seemed to 
originate in Pakistan. 
In addition, Pakistan currently possesses nuclear technology, as well as nuclear 
weapons that would also be a tantalizing acquisition for non-state actors, such as a 
terrorist organization, because officials in the Pakistani government are likely, to be 
sympathetic to the ideology associated with terrorist organizations. Pakistan began 
building its nuclear program during the mid-1970s with the purpose of enriching 
uranium. By the mid-1980s, Pakistan had a clandestine uranium enrichment facility. It 
was as early as 1989 that the United States concluded that Islamabad, which is the capitol 
of the country, had acquired the capability to assemble a first-generation nuclear device.64  
Pakistan is believed to have stockpiled approximately 580-800kg of HEU, which is a 
sufficient amount of material to build 30-50 fission bombs.65  The nuclear materials and 
weapons sites in Pakistan are under better protection than the Russian sites; however, 
ideological mindsets may help to create a sense of sympathy for terrorist organizations 
and their causes. As a result, a sympathetic government official or military commander 
may be willing to share information or materials with a terrorist organization.  
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Finally, the threat of nuclear weapons is also real and credible in the country of 
North Korea.  Like Iran, North Korea has been asked to stop its nuclear programs and has 
also refused. The country had remained nuclearly dormant from 1994 to approximately 
2002.  According to a December 2001 National Intelligence Council report, the U.S. 
intelligence community ascertained in the mid-1990s that North Korea had produced one, 
and possibly two, nuclear weapons.66  In October 2002, North Korea confirmed U.S. 
intelligence reports that it had a clandestine enriched uranium weapons program in 
violation of the Agreed Framework and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.67  In 
December 2002, Pyongyang, which is the capitol, lifted the freeze on its plutonium-based 
nuclear weapons program and expelled IAEA inspectors who had been monitoring the 
freeze under the Agreed Framework of October 1994.68 Discrepancies between North 
Korean declarations and IAEA inspection findings indicated that North Korea might have 
reprocessed enough plutonium for one or two more nuclear weapons.69  By mid-2002, 
U.S. intelligence discovered that North Korea had been receiving materials from Pakistan 
for a highly enriched uranium production facility. 
 Iran, Pakistan, North Korea, and the former Soviet Union all present a security 
risk to the United States, either by the direct threat of an attack or as a supply mechanism 
for nuclear weapons or materials to a terrorist organization.  The current climate suggests 
that countries like North Korea and Iran are going to pursue their nuclear ambitions 
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without regard to world opinion, UN sanctions or western rhetoric.  In summation, 
Pakistan has proven to be a nuclear material and information clearing house for rogue 
states.  It has supplied both Iran and North Korea with the materials and the technical 
knowledge necessary to operationalize their nuclear programs and facilities.  However, 
the former Soviet Union poses an equal, if not greater, risk because of their large quantity 
of lightly guarded nuclear weapons and materials. While the former Soviet Union has the 
greatest quantity of nuclear weapons and materials, countries like Pakistan and Iran pose 
a more significant risk to the United States because of their religious, philosophical, and 
financial ties to Islamic terrorism. In addition, although it is unlikely, any of the eight 
nuclear powers pose proliferation risks. Only a small amount of HEU is needed to have 
devastating consequences. 
 
Movement of nuclear material and weapons 
If terrorists were able to steal, buy, or make a nuclear weapon, evidence suggests 
that the U.S. government and its intelligence and security agencies would have a difficult 
time stopping the terrorist organization from smuggling the weapon into the United 
States.  Thousands of tons of illegal drugs and millions of illegal immigrants cross U.S. 
borders each year, despite massive efforts to stop them.70  The essential ingredients of a 
nuclear bomb can fit easily into a briefcase and can be made quite difficult to detect and 
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easy to transport.  Unlike the situation with drugs or illegal immigrants, nuclear terrorists 
only have to succeed once to cause a terrifying catastrophe.71
  
 Terrorists and transnational criminals continually take advantage of every known 
legal resource for moving people, goods, and services across international borders.  The 
United States is not free from this problem.  In fact, virtually every known or suspected 
terrorist has exploited legal opportunities to enter or remain in the United States.72  Most 
terrorists, including the 9/11 hijackers passed through screening at an established point of 
entry.  In addition, many of the hijackers passed through security check points on 
multiple occasions.  These vulnerabilities make it likely that terrorists will continue to use 
sophisticated travel methods to enter the United States, including acquiring new passports 
to hide past travel.73  In addition, freight coming into the United States is screened with 
minimal standards. 
According to the Department of Transportation, statistics show that approximately 
10,456,473 loaded containers came through ports into the United States in 200474. 
Currently, the Department of Homeland Security has the capabilities to screen 
approximately two percent of the containers entering the United States.  In addition, 
approximately 11,407,570 trucks transporting goods crossed the border into the United 
States in 200475.  Proportionately, very few of these vehicles were checked as well.  Rail 
lines were also used heavily in border crossings.  In 2004, approximately 1,790,382 rail 
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cars entered into the United States.76 Again, a minimal amount of rail cars were 
examined.  
Terrorists and transnational criminals are able to cross borders almost unhindered. 
The luggage they carry with them can contain devices that can produce catastrophic 
results.  Furthermore, evidence suggests that the program used to screen containers 
coming into the United States does not screen enough containers to even serve as a 
deterrent.  In addition, the 9/11 Commission concluded that “the challenge for national 
security in an age of terrorism is to prevent the very few people who may pose 
overwhelming risks from entering or remaining in the United States undetected.”77  
Materials, as well as people, must be tracked and examined before they enter into the 
United States in order to create a better sense of security.  Border checkpoints and 
crossings serve as the last line of defense against terrorist organizations attempting to 
enter into the United States.
 
Effects of an Attack 
The use of a tactical or an improvised nuclear weapon would most likely occur 
against a large population center or another key target.  The attack would be designed to 
create a mass casualty incident with extensive direct and collateral damage to the 
government, critical infrastructure, financial institutions, military and corporate 
institutions78.  An attack on Washington D.C., New York, or Los Angeles would provide 
the optimal strike option for a terrorist organization.  
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An attack on the Washington D.C. metro area using a ten kiloton weapon would 
have the potential of inflicting, as many as, 300,000 deaths according to a Department of 
Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) report.79  The report that was 
published in 2003 described the detonation of an improvised nuclear device in the 
Washington D.C. metro area.  After detonation of the weapon, a radioactive plume began 
moving northeast over Prince George and Howard counties.  Both counties had difficulty 
evacuating their residents, which increased their total number of fatalities.  Another 
report published during the same time period had similar findings. 
According to a Homeland Security Council (HSC) report prepared in July of 
2004, a similar scenario was used in which a ten kiloton weapon was detonated in the 
Washington D.C. metro area.  In this particular projection wind direction was different, 
and the emergency management officials were able to evacuate more people than the 
NNSA scenario.  The loss of life from this scenario was estimated at between 99,000 and 
190,000 people.80  In either scenario, a blast from a ten kiloton weapon would destroy 
everything within a half mile of the epicenter and cause severe damage for miles beyond.  
The area affected would be contaminated for many years and would likely be deemed 
uninhabitable.  The loss of life and the loss of property would be staggering.  
The Department of Homeland Security offered yet another scenario for a nuclear 
attack on Washington D.C. in their publication National Planning Scenarios 2005.  This 
particular document was created for use in federal, state, local, and homeland security 
preparedness activities.  This particular scenario described the detonation of a 10-kiloton, 
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Uranium-235, gun-type nuclear device in the central business district of Washington 
D.C.81  The detonation is assumed to take place during working hours at 10:00 a.m. on a 
weekday.82  The population distribution used is based on U.S. Census (nighttime) data 
with two additional population densities added in order to represent the workday influx 
into the center of the city.83  Specifically, 481,000 people were added inside a three mile 
radius of the detonation site, and 220,000 additional people were added inside a seven 
mile wide annulus with an inner radius of three miles.84  Additionally, the wind was light 
out of the west-southwest.85
High numbers of casualties would be expected with this type of attack.  Persons 
exposed to a nuclear explosion may be killed or suffer various types of injuries.  Direct 
and indirect blast effects, thermal radiation, and ionizing radiation are the primary causes 
of injury or death.  Typically, there are two types of casualties involving the detonation of 
a nuclear weapon.  First, blast fatalities and injuries result from “translation or tumbling” 
which is the human body being thrown. “Translation or impact” are items impacting the 
human body, lung damage, and eardrum rupture.86  Typically, blast casualties occur from 
the direct action of the pressure wave, the impact of projectiles and fragments (including 
glass) created from explosion-energized materials, and whole body translation and 
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impact.87  In this scenario, approximately 46,61288 individuals were exposed to the blast.  
Of those individuals exposed 14,623 were fatalities, while 31,430 were considered to be 
casualties.89  According to the scenario, a little less than 1% of the population near the 
epicenter escaped injury.  
The second categorization of casualties as a result of the detonation of a nuclear 
weapon deals with radiation exposure.  Burn casualties may result from the absorption of 
thermal radiation energy by the skin, heating, ignition of clothing caused by thermal 
radiation, and structural fires started by the thermal pulse or as side effects of the air blast 
or the ground shock.  In this scenario, approximately 303,07190 individuals were exposed 
to the radiation.  Of those individuals exposed 190,167 were fatalities, while 264,486 
were considered to be casualties.91   
Additionally, long term causalities would be likely to occur due to chronic 
radiation exposure or fallout, in the form of cancers.  Radiation casualties following a 
nuclear detonation may be caused by prompt nuclear radiation or by radiation from the 
radioactive fallout, or both.  In this scenario, approximately 1,358,718 individuals were 
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exposed to the plume of radioactive material.92  Of those individuals exposed 24,580 
would acquire fatal cancers, while 49,160 would acquire some other type of cancer.93   
 
Summary 
The threat is clear. Nuclear materials or weapons in the possession of a terrorist 
organization or non-state actor present a grave risk to the national security of the United 
States.  First and foremost, it is clear that terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda, are 
actively seeking nuclear material and weapons to perpetrate violence.  The evidence 
suggests that terrorist organizations are most likely to obtain nuclear material and 
weapons from the former Soviet Union, Iran, North Korea, or Pakistan.  Furthermore, the 
data also suggests that the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union is lightly guarded 
and is accessible by terrorist organizations and other criminals.  In addition, it suggests 
that individuals in Pakistan and Iran with access to nuclear materials or knowledge of 
nuclear science may be sympathetic to the causes of Al Qaeda or one of its affiliates. 
Moreover, a threat clearly originates from within North Korea itself.  
These scenarios, coupled with the fact that the United States’ borders, ports, and 
points of entry are not secure, provide a very real and catastrophic threat to the nation’s 
security.  For many years drug and human trafficking have run rampant across the 
borders of the United States.  Furthermore, the United States allocates far more resources 
toward other aspects of government.  Since the invasion of Iraq, the United States has 
spent $200 billion on the war in Iraq but only $2 billion on securing the nuclear materials 
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that are most likely targeted by Al Qaeda.94  Additionally, in the two years after 
September 11, the United States has secured less nuclear material than was secured in the 
two years prior to September 11, 2001.95  The conditions are inviting for an Al Qaeda 
attack.  
The worst case scenario is an attack on a major metropolitan area in the United 
States.  A nuclear attack on Washington D.C., Los Angeles, or New York would cripple 
the economy, fracture the government, and take the resolve out of the American public.  
The attack would contaminate the area around ground zero for years to come making 
rescue and cleanup very risky.  First responders would be placed in jeopardy while trying 
to help the injured.  The hospitals in the Washington D.C. metro area would not have 
enough resources to adequately deal with the emergency.   The operation of government 
would cease because much of its physical structure would be destroyed.  Furthermore, the 
services necessary for the rebuilding of affected areas and helping the victims would be 
unavailable or nonexistent.  A real and credible threat exists.  Al Qaeda or one of its 
affiliates will use nuclear weapons in one form or another against the United States if 
they are able to acquire the weapons.  The results of such an attack would be devastating 
and demoralizing. 
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VII. The Policy Response to Nuclear Terrorism 
 
 
As was described in the methodology, a comprehensive directory of the public laws, 
enacted from September 11, 2001 until January 1, 2005, dealing with the threat of nuclear 
terrorism was created.  The directory was generated searching by subject and date using 
THOMAS.  THOMAS is the Library of Congress’s legislative database. According to 
THOMAS, subject terms were created by legislative analysts from the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress. Analysts closely examine the content 
of each bill and resolution and assign (index) as many subject terms as are required to 
describe the measure's substance and effects. Terms appearing in the subjects display 
come from a list that is based upon the CRS Legislative Indexing Vocabulary (LIV), a 
thesaurus developed to classify public policy subject matter.  The following subject terms 
were used the in query: nuclear weapons, nuclear terrorism, and nuclear proliferation. 
Additional analysis was conducted using the Congressional Quarterly Almanac Index.  
The terms homeland security, terrorism, and nuclear weapons were used for this portion 
of the analysis. There were no additional significant measures adopted from September 
11, 2001 until January 1, 2005, dealing with the threat of nuclear terrorism. In some 
instances, amendments were added to various pieces of legislation dealing specifically 
with appropriations. 
 
 
The 107th Congress 
 
The following public laws in the 107th Congress were identified as a result of THOMAS 
search mechanism. 
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2001 
 
• Public Law 107-56, The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot 
Act) Act Of 2001, which was signed into law on October 26, 2001 
 
• Public Law 107-63, The Department of the Interior and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 2002, which was signed into law on November 5, 2001 
 
• Public Law 107-66, The Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 
2002, which was signed into law on November 12, 2001 
 
• Public Law 107-71, The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which was 
signed into law on November 19, 2001 
 
• Public Law 107-107, The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2002, which was signed into law on December 28, 2001. 
 
 
 2002 
 
• Public Law 107-115, The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act, 2002, which was signed into law on January 
10, 2002. 
 
• Public Law107-116, The Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, 
and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002 which was 
signed into law on January 10, 2002. 
 
• Public Law 107-117, The Department of Defense and Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery From and Response to the 
Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002 which was signed into law on 
January 10, 2002. 
 
• Public Law 107-173, Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act 
of 2002, which was signed into law on May 14, 2002. 
 
• Public Law 107-188, Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness 
and Response Act Of 2002, which was signed into law on June 12, 2002. 
 
• Public Law 107-197, The Terrorist Bombings Convention Implementation 
Act of 2002, which was signed into law on June 25, 2002. 
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• Public Law 107-206, The 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further 
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, which 
was signed into law on August 2, 2002. 
 
• Public Law 107-228, The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 
2003, which was signed into law on September 30, 2002. 
 
• Public Law 107-248, The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, 
which was singed into law on October 23, 2002. 
 
• Public Law 107-273, The 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations 
Authorization Act, which was singed into law on November 2, 2002. 
 
• Public Law 107-287, The Department of Veterans Affairs Emergency 
Preparedness Act of 2002, which was singed into law on November 7, 2002. 
 
 
• Public Law 107-295, The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, 
which was singed into law on November 25, 2002. 
 
• Public Law 107-296, The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which was singed 
into law on November 25, 2002. 
 
• Public Law 107-306, The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, 
which was singed into law on November 27, 2002. 
 
• Public Law 107-314, The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2003, which was singed into law on December 2, 2002. 
 
 
 
The 108th Congress 
  
The following public laws in the 108th Congress were identified as a result of THOMAS 
search mechanism. 
 
2003 
 
• Public Law 108-7, The Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, which 
was singed into law on February 20, 2003. 
 
• Public Law 108-11, The Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations 
Act, 2003, which was singed into law on April 16, 2003. 
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• Public Law 108-87, The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, 
which was singed into law on September 30, 2003. 
 
• Public Law 108-90, The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations 
Act, 2004, which was singed into law on October 1, 2003. 
 
• Public Law 108-108, The Department of the Interior and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 2004, which was singed into law on November 10, 2003. 
 
• Public Law 108-136, The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2004, which was singed into law on November 24, 2003. 
 
• Public Law 108-137, The Energy and Water Development Appropriations 
Act, 2004, which was singed into law on December 1, 2003. 
 
• Public Law 108-175, The Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty 
Restoration Act of 2003, which was signed into law on December 12, 2003. 
 
• Public Law 108-183, The Veterans Benefits Act of 2003, which was signed 
into law on December 16, 2003. 
 
 
• Public Law 108-188, The Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 
2003, which was signed into law on December 17, 2003 
 
 
2004 
 
• Public Law 108-276, the Project BioShield Act of 2004, which was signed 
into law on July 21, 2004. 
 
• Public Law 108-287, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005, 
which was signed into law on August 5, 2004. 
 
• Public Law 108-334, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations 
Act, 2005, which was signed into law on October 18, 2004. 
 
• Public Law 108-375, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2005, which was signed into law on October 28, 2004. 
 
• Public Law 108-447, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, which was 
signed into law on December 8, 2004. 
 
• Public Law 108-458, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004, which was signed into law on December 17, 2004. 
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• Public Law 108-487, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, 
which was signed into law on December 23, 2004. 
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VIII. Analysis 
 
 The analysis conducted for this research will be classified by the date the public 
law was enacted.  Each public law will have a heading followed by a brief description of 
its legislative trek. In addition, each public law will have a summary of the broader 
intentions of law as well as detailed analysis of that particular law’s contribution to policy 
relating specifically to the prevention, deterrence, or response of nuclear terrorism. 
Furthermore, the public law will be analyzed to determine if it serves as a prevention or a 
deterrence, a protection against, or a response to an act of nuclear terrorism.  Finally, a 
brief summary of any unintended effects or contributions the law may have on public 
policy.  The laws are arranged according to the Congress that enacted them. 
 
USA Patriot Act 
 
 Directly following the September 11, 2001 attacks, John Ashcroft introduced a 
proposal that contained aggressive measures for combating terrorism.  Despite concerns 
about the possible impact on civil liberties, the House and the Senate overwhelmingly 
agreed to give the Bush administration far-reaching new authority to track, prosecute, and 
arrest suspected terrorists.96  Many differences and objections concerning the bill were 
ironed out behind closed doors in committee meetings involving key lawmakers and 
administration officials.97  The end result was HR 3162.  The bill passed both chambers 
and was signed into law on October 26, 2001.98   
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 The law dealt with surveillance issues, money laundering, border control 
measures, benefits for aliens, victims’ compensation, changes in criminal law, the 
investigation of terrorism, and changes in intelligence gathering and dissemination. Some 
of the most controversial parts of the bill deal with the various types of surveillance.   
Section 203 promotes greater information sharing, by allowing information that is 
received during grand jury testimony to be shared with both the law enforcement and the 
intelligence communities.   In addition, sections 207 and 214 allow law enforcement 
personnel to obtain information with greater ease through FISA warrants, wiretaps, 
nationwide search warrants, and sneak and peek searches.  Furthermore, section 209 
allows law enforcement personnel to obtain voicemail messages, while section 210 
pertains to credit card information, business records, and Internet communication 
tracking information to help with the pursuit and apprehension of potential terrorists and 
criminals.  Section 205 authorizes the FBI to hire additional translators to assist with the 
translation of intelligence. 
   Title III, entitled International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-terror 
Financing takes unprecedented action against terrorist financing and money laundering 
issues.  The law allows the Treasury Secretary to impose special measures on foreign 
financial institutions, as well as transactions that are determined to be used for money 
laundering.  The law also promotes greater information sharing with regard to terrorist 
financing and money laundering.  In addition, several anti-money laundering programs 
were implemented as a result of the legislation.  Title III offers law enforcement 
personnel the tools that are needed to effectively track terrorist financing.  Furthermore, 
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the law describes the offenses, as well as punishments for those who are apprehended and 
convicted for money laundering violations. 
 Title IV, entitled Protecting the Border addresses border control issues.  Section 
404 increased the number of INS personnel by waiving the cap on the number of full time 
employees at the INS.  Furthermore, this section also removed the cap on the total 
number of overtime hours as well.  In addition, section 401 tripled the number of border 
personnel along the Canadian border. The law also set standards and a timetable for the 
development of identification technology such as an automated fingerprint system, the 
sharing of National Crime Information Center’s Identification Index and the Wanted 
Persons File.  Additionally, the law broadened the definition of terrorist activities by 
adding the use of explosives and other dangerous devices to the definition. Section 412 
allows for the mandatory detention of an individual who is suspected to be involved with 
a terrorist organization or activity. Finally, section 417 requires that machine-readable 
passports be issued by countries who wish to participate in the Visa Waiver Program.  
The law also requires that a better tracking system for foreign students be implemented. 
 Measures are in place, as a result of The Patriot Act, to better assist in the 
investigation and the tracking of the financial networks of terrorism.  Section 501 states 
that there is no limit to the amount of a reward for information regarding the capture of a 
terrorist; however, the Attorney General must approve rewards over $250,000.  Section 
503 requires that a DNA database is to be kept of convicted offenders.  In addition, 
financial information, educational information, as well as intelligence gathered from 
various sources must be shared with several agencies. 
 
 49
 The Patriot Act helps to define the parameters for prosecution, as well as a 
general sense of the offenses that are now considered to be terrorist activities.  In 
addition, the law increases measures that track terrorist financing and increases the 
number of border personnel.  However, the Patriot Act does not make a direct reference 
to nuclear terrorism or introduce any measures that may help deter or prevent an attack.  
Section 2339, entitled Harboring or concealing terrorists states that whoever harbors or 
conceals any person who has, or is likely to, commit an offense relating to or involving 
nuclear materials or the sabotage of nuclear facilities is to be fined or imprisoned if they 
are found guilty of that offense.  In addition, it is considered a federal crime of terrorism 
if an individual participates in a crime involving nuclear materials, weapons, or facilities.  
Furthermore, Section 810, entitled Alternate Maximum Penalties for Terrorism, adds to 
the length of prison sentences for acts of terrorism that involve, but are not limited to, 
nuclear materials, weapons, or facilities.   
 While the Patriot Act has made it easier for law enforcement officials to track, 
monitor, arrest, and prosecute terrorists, it has done little to adequately deter or prevent 
nuclear terrorism. However, the law will enable law enforcement personnel to have 
greater access to information that may, in turn, prevent an act of nuclear terrorism. This 
bill can be effective if law enforcement personnel are able to gather and process 
information regarding terrorist threats in a timely fashion.  While the Patriot Act does not 
directly reference or deal with threats of nuclear terrorism, the doors that it has opened 
for law enforcement personnel may allow them to gain valuable information that could be 
used to prevent or deter a nuclear attack.  In addition, the databases that the law has 
designated for creation will most likely aid law enforcement and intelligence personnel in 
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the tracking and apprehension of terrorist suspects.  The Patriot Act does not contain 
specific language that would suggest that it serves as a protection against an act of 
nuclear terrorism. However, the law increases that number of border personnel and the 
hours that they can work, which effectively adds greater protection to the borders of the 
United States.  This, in turn, may prevent a terrorist organization from smuggling nuclear 
materials or weapons across the border, thus reducing the risk to the United States.  The 
law does not address the response to a terrorist event. The Patriot Act serves as a law 
enforcement tool more than anything else. 
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The Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
 
 The need for a more comprehensive and structured approach to aviation security 
was extremely evident following the September 11, 2001 attacks.  The law began as S 
1447, which was written largely as a result of negotiations among lawmakers and the 
White House.99  The Senate unanimously passed the measure on October 11, 2001, which 
called for a full federalization of airport security.100  However, House members opposed 
the approach taken by the Senate.  After several weeks of debate, the House leadership 
backed down, clearing the way for the passage of the bill on November 16, 2001.101  The 
bill was signed into law on November 19, 2001.102
 The law has several key features, but its underlying goal is to secure the aviation 
industry through federalization.103  The law places great emphasis on the screening of 
baggage and passengers by promoting training and performance standards for the new 
federal security screeners.  In general, the law makes the federal government directly 
responsible for airport passenger and baggage screening by relieving the airlines of that 
responsibility.  In order to achieve these objectives, section 109 requires that all airport 
screeners must be federal employees within one year of enactment.  However, section 
108 also allows up to five airports to opt-out of the federalized program and use private 
screeners.  Additional airports would be allowed to opt-out if the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) found that the private screeners provided equal or superior levels 
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of security.  Furthermore, section 108 requires that all areas of aviation security now must 
have federal supervision.  Finally, section 110 requires that all checked baggage has to be 
screened using x-ray technologies, as well as explosive detection devices.  A large 
portion of the law also deals with employee standards, citizenship issues, hiring and 
firing, no strike provisions, passenger profiling, and restricted access areas.104  
 The law also contains many provisions for aircraft and crew security.  Section 105 
now requires the use of air marshals on flights that are deemed to be high risk.  Section 
104 increases the physical security of cockpits by reinforcing cockpit doors.  In addition, 
section 128 allows pilots to have firearms in the cockpits under certain circumstances.  
Furthermore, section 104 states that aircraft are to be equipped with switches for flight 
crews to notify pilots once a hijacking has occurred.  Steps were also taken to prevent 
highjackers from turning off transponders after a hijacking.  Additionally, section 107 
requires flight crews to get additional training to help deter or prevent potential 
hijackings.   
 Section 101 also creates a new agency, the Transportation Security 
Administration, that is designed to oversee and administer the country’s transportation 
security needs.  The section states that the TSA is responsible for the day-to-day security 
operations involving all modes of transportation.  This includes civil aviation, rail, 
highway, and water transportation.  The agency is responsible for developing standards 
for the hiring of passenger and baggage screeners.  In addition, the agency is responsible 
for the supervision and training of screening personnel, as well as administering the 
federal air marshal program.  Finally, section 102 establishes an oversight board, which is 
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made up of representatives from Departments of Defense, Justice, Transportation, and 
Treasury, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, and the 
Office of Homeland Security.   
 While the Aviation and Transportation Security Act made progress in securing 
civil aviation for the United States, it has done little to prevent or deter an act of nuclear 
terrorism.  In addition, the law does not make any specific reference to nuclear terrorism. 
The law implements an aggressive plan to secure the nation’s aviation industry by 
screening all passengers and carry-on luggage; however, vulnerabilities in air cargo 
security still exist.  The security practices implemented by the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act and the Transportation Security Administration once again 
demonstrate a reactive, rather than a proactive, approach by the United States 
government.  Furthermore, the TSA focuses many of its resources on one particular mode 
of transportation, which is aviation security, while not adequately addressing the other 
modes of transportation.  A layered approach must be taken, with equal importance 
placed on each mode of transportation.  A wholesome approach is needed if the United 
States is going to secure all modes of transportation.  It is fair to say that the United 
States is safer today than it was on September 10, 2001, but a more inclusive and 
comprehensive transportation security plan must be implemented with some emphasis 
placed on the threat of nuclear terrorism. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
make no specific contribution to the deterrence or prevention of nuclear terrorism. In 
addition, the law makes no contribution to a directed response to an attack involving 
nuclear terrorism.  
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Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
 The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act was 
introduced in 2001 out of concern that the nation’s public health system was unprepared 
to handle a major bioterrorism act and other public health emergencies.  As a result, HR 
3448 was introduced, and was passed on December 12, 2001.105  The Senate passed HR 
3448 by voice vote on December 20, 2001 after it substituted the text of S 1765.106  The 
House adopted the conference report on May 22, 2002, and the Senate cleared the bill on 
May 23, 2002.107  The President signed the bill into law on June 12, 2002.108
 The law contains several key provisions.  Section 121 authorizes $1.15 billion in 
FY2002, as well as unspecified sums in subsequent years for the Department of Health 
and Human Service (HHS) to expand its supplies of medicines and other vaccines to be 
used to respond to a terrorist attack involving chemical, biological, nuclear, or 
radiological devices.  Section 319C-1 authorizes $1.6 billion in FY2003 to state and local 
organizations to improve preparedness and planning, laboratory capacity, train healthcare 
workers, as well as develop new drugs, vaccines, and therapies to respond to an attack.  
In addition, section 351A tightens controls on individuals who possess and handle 
dangerous biological agents and toxins.  Furthermore, section 351A requires that a 
national database be constructed to contain the names and other information of 
individuals who possessed, used, or transferred certain dangerous toxins or agents.   
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Section 317R increases the funding of food safety efforts, specifically at points of 
entry into the United States.  In addition, section 321 requires foreign drug manufacturers 
to register annually before being allowed to import drugs and medical devices into the 
United States.  Section 401 also authorizes $160 million in FY2002 to protect the safety 
of drinking water in the United States.  Furthermore, section 1433 requires that drinking 
water systems across the country provide the EPA with assessments of their vulnerability 
to terrorist attacks, as well as plans to prepare and respond to terrorist attacks on their 
particular water system.   
 Section 127 of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act discusses the storage and the distribution of potassium iodide tablets in 
order to provide adequate protection in response to a nuclear incident.  These tablets will 
be stored in large quantities at schools and hospitals within twenty miles of a nuclear 
power facility for distribution by state and local officials during an emergency.  In 
addition, large quantities of tablets will be stored strategically to effectively respond to a 
nuclear incident.  The law also states that within one year of the date of enactment the 
President, in consultation with other members representing the appropriate federal, state, 
and local agencies, shall establish guidelines for the stockpiling, distribution, and 
utilization of potassium iodide tablets in response to a nuclear incident.  Finally, section 
152 instructs the Secretary of Energy and the administrator of the National Nuclear 
Security Administration to outline research objectives relevant to the rapid detection and 
identification of materials that may be used in a chemical, biological, nuclear, or 
radiological attack.  The law requires that these agencies submit a report no later than 180 
days after the enactment of the law. 
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In conclusion, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act deals primarily with issues and scenarios common to a biological attack, 
but the law does make some reference to nuclear agents that were displaced either by an 
attack or by the accidental release from a nuclear power facility.  The law does call for 
the Secretary of Energy and the administrator of the National Nuclear Security 
Administration to outline research objectives to increase the likelihood of detecting a 
nuclear attack.  However this law, like the others, deals primarily with the detection and 
response to an attack involving nuclear agents.  
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Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act  
 
 The need for better border security was evident following the September 11, 2001 
attacks.  The House version of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, 
HR 3525, passed in early December 2001, but its companion bill in the Senate had been 
stalled.109  In March of 2002, the House attached several provisions to a separate bill, HR 
1885.110  However, it soon became clear that by trying to combine both bills, the passage 
was only being further complicated.  The Senate then turned back to the House’s stand-
alone measure and passed HR 3525.111  The President singed the bill into law on May 14, 
2002.112
 The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 was a 
response to what many perceived as weaknesses in the immigration system.  Therefore, 
the bill did not focus on any of the physical security weaknesses in the United States 
border protection.  The law contained several key provisions spanning three categories of 
border controls, the visa system, and travel documents.  One of the main components of 
the law, section 101, was the increase in the number of Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) inspectors.  The department was authorized to add 200 inspectors and 200 
investigative personnel each year for the next five years beginning with its inception in 
2002.  Section 102 authorized $150 million in computer upgrades to replace the outdated 
and antiquated computer systems.  The main purpose of the upgrades was to efficiently 
check travel documents such as visas and passports.  In addition, the wages of border 
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agents and investigative personnel were increased, as well as adding additional training 
requirements for officers.  
 The existing visa system was also a target of the new law.  Section 306 prohibited 
the issuance of temporary visas for business or travel to citizens from countries that 
regularly sponsor terrorism because they were deemed to be high risk.  Regulations for 
student visas were also changed.  As a result of section 501, schools who admitted 
foreign students were now required to track student participation in activities and notify 
government officials when foreign students did not attend class.  In addition, section 204 
required that the Chimera database be constructed.  The database would be used to share 
information on individuals with terrorist ties among the various federal agencies, 
therefore allowing officials to conduct more thorough background checks on individuals 
attempting to enter the United States.  The system would also include a watch list with 
the names of suspected terrorists. 
 Finally, the system dealing with travel documents and manifests was also altered 
slightly.  Section 307 requires countries who participate in the Visa Waiver Program to 
inform government officials immediately concerning the thefts of blank passports.  In 
addition, section 303 requires a program to be commissioned to implement high-tech, 
machine readable visas.  The program requires that all visas issued by the Department of 
State be machine readable, tamper resistant, and contain biometric identifiers.  
Furthermore, section 402 requires all incoming or outgoing commercial aircraft and 
vessels to supply customs officials with manifests listing all the passengers and crew 
onboard.   
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 The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 helps to create 
several standards that are necessary to protect the United States borders from terrorists or 
criminal organizations.  However, the law makes no direct reference to nuclear terrorism. 
The law does not deter or prevent nuclear terrorism directly, but it does implement 
measures that are designed to stop terrorists from entering the country with fraudulent 
travel documents. In addition, as was similar in the Patriot Act, this law increases the 
number of Immigration and Naturalization Inspectors and provides funding for computer 
system upgrades. While these provisions are improvements over the current system, 
many more initiatives must be taken to adequately secure the borders of the United 
States. Furthermore, the law makes no suggestions on how to physically secure the 
border from lethal items, such as improvised nuclear devices or other harmful weapons. 
The law focuses primarily on people rather than the transport of goods. The Enhanced 
Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act does not address the response to a terrorist 
event involving nuclear terrorism. 
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Port Security Act 
 
 The need for a comprehensive plan to protect the nation’s 361 commercial 
seaports was clear following the attacks of 9/11.  The Port Security Act of 2002 expanded 
and formalized the preeminent role assumed by the Coast Guard.  Experts argue that the 
impact on safety and counterterrorism is likely to be minimal due to a lack of money.113  
Much debate surrounded the bill concerning the estimated $4 billion in funding needed 
over six years.  However, both the House and the Senate were able to agree on the bill 
and cleared it on November 14, 2002, after adopting a compromised bill.114  The bill was 
signed into law on November 25, 2002 
 The Port Security Act has several main provisions.  First, section 70102 requires 
that the Coast Guard conduct vulnerability assessments of US seaports, vessels, and other 
shoreline facilities.115  These facilities include, but are not limited to, nuclear power 
plants and chemical facilities. Once the assessment has been conducted, the Coast Guard 
is required to develop plan to secure any vulnerabilities that were identified.  
Furthermore, section 70112 calls for the creation of regional security advisory 
committees to coordinate planning amongst law enforcement, intelligence, U.S. Customs, 
Coast Guard, and other personnel in a predetermined geographic area.  In addition, 
section 70106 requires the Coast Guard to establish response teams. These teams will be 
made up of maritime safety and security personnel that can be deployed rapidly in the 
event of a terrorist attack.  These teams are to be stationed strategically amongst U.S. 
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 61
seaports.  Additionally, section 107 was included in the law to allow Coast Guard 
personnel to act as armed “sea marshals” to board incoming vessels to respond to or 
prevent acts of terrorism.  
 Funding issues were also dealt with in the Port Security Act. Section 70107 
created a new grant program through fiscal year 2008 to assist states and municipalities in 
upgrading security and response measures at local ports.  Additionally, the law authorized 
$15 million per year for research and development of technology to detect suspicious 
cargo and another $5.5 million was authorized per year to train maritime security 
workers.  The Department of Transportation is tasked with the development and 
implementation of a national transportation security identification card.  The cards would 
be used for identification purposes to limit access to restricted areas within port 
facilities.116  In addition, section 70108 requires the Coast Guard to conduct foreign port 
assessments to determine security vulnerabilities that exist at ports abroad.  
 Additionally, the Port Security Act addresses container security issues. Section 
111 requires that the Department of Transportation develop and maintain an anti-
terrorism cargo identification system, as well as a tracking and screening system for 
containerized cargo shipped through U.S. ports.  In addition, the department is required to 
develop standards for container locks and seals to assist with the detection of tampering.  
Furthermore, section 108 tasks the U.S. Customs Service with the responsibility of 
requiring shipping companies to provide electronic information on cargo coming into or 
leaving the United States.  Additionally, section 70113 requires the Department of 
Transportation establish a maritime intelligence program to collect and analyze 
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information on vessels operating in U.S. territorial waters, which were extended from 
three miles offshore to twelve miles.117  Section 112 also required that tracking systems 
or the use of transponders must be used to identify vessels and their locations operating in 
U.S. territorial waters.  In addition, section 502 authorized that the Coast Guard receive 
$6 billion for operations in FY2003. 
 Under Subtitle IV, entitled Miscellaneous, in Chapter 701, entitled Port Security, 
the procedure that describes the allocation of grants is described.  A grant is awarded to 
help increase the ability of the Customs Service to inspect or target inspection goods 
carried on any vessel that will arrive, or has arrived, or is at any port in the United States.  
Additionally, this section authorizes the purchase of equipment to detect various other 
harmful items.  The law states that the equipment should be able to accurately detect 
explosives, chemical or biological agents, and nuclear materials that could be used to 
commit terrorist acts against the United States.  In addition, this section suggests that 
scintillation-based detection equipment capable of attachment spreaders, which are used 
to signal the presence of nuclear materials during the unloading of containers, be 
purchased.  
 While progress has been made in regard to port security, provisions for deterring 
or preventing nuclear materials or nuclear weapons in the Port Security Act of 2002 are 
almost non-existent.  It is important that the Port Security Act be effective because one of 
the 361 seaports in the United States is the most likely point of entry for nuclear materials 
or weapons.  Container shipments are preferred by terrorists because only two to three 
percent of cargo containers are inspected by security personnel.  Nearly ten percent of the 
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containers coming into US ports would have to be inspected to serve as at least a credible 
deterrent.  The provisions made in the law are along the right track but, because the Port 
Security Act does not contain provisions for an increase in container searches, the law 
may not adequately defend against nuclear terrorist threats.  In addition, reports suggest 
that the funding is not available for initiatives to secure seaports.  Furthermore, billions of 
dollars are required to repair or replace the Coast Guard’s aging fleet that is needed to 
serve a central role in the deterrence or prevention of shipments of nuclear weapons and 
materials into the United States from terrorist organizations abroad.  One of the most 
effective measures to be adopted to protect against a nuclear attack was the initiative that 
involved the use of container lock and seals as well as the use of electronic tracking 
equipments.  Once again, this law does little to prevent or deter a terrorist attack using a 
nuclear device. 
 The Port Security Act does little for the protection of the United States as well.  
The law puts into motion many initiatives; but these initiatives are only studies of 
potential vulnerabilities, not courses of action to address the vulnerabilities that have 
been identified. The law also helped to make grant money available to state and local 
governments to help secure ports, but it is slow to implement technologies that would be 
effective in protecting against nuclear threats.   The law does address the response to 
maritime terrorist attacks. The law called for the creation of Maritime Safety and Security 
teams to respond to terrorist incidents. These teams would respond to incidents either by 
force or as recovery personnel.  However, this role is currently vaguely defined.  
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Homeland Security Act 
 
The idea of combining several federal agencies to combat terrorism, as well as 
clarifying lines of authority, began in the House and the Senate in 2001, following the 
9/11 attacks.118  In May of 2002, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee approved S 
2452 to create a cabinet level Homeland Security Department, as well as a separate 
Whitehouse entity that dealt specifically with homeland security.119  Much debate raged 
over personnel provisions in the new bill and slowed the legislative process.  However, 
the House did pass a new version of the bill, HR 5710.  A final compromised version of 
the bill, HR 5005, was passed on November 19, 2002.  The Homeland Security Act of 
2002 was signed into law a little more than one year after the attacks of September 11, 
2001 on November 25, 2002.120
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the Homeland Security Department, 
which many hoped to be the all inclusive bill for homeland security. The law 
incorporated all or parts of twenty-two federal agencies that were divided into four 
directorates: Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Science and 
Technology, Border and Transportation Security, and Emergency Preparedness and 
Response.  The mission of the Homeland Security Department is to prevent terrorist 
attacks within the United States, reduce the nation’s vulnerability to such attacks, and to 
make sure that the country is prepared to deal with any disaster that results from an 
attack, which is described in Section 101.  The law also describes the hierarchy of the 
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organization, human resources, union rights, civil rights, and employee’s rights.  In 
addition, several miscellaneous provisions are found within the law.   
First, section 901 establishes the Homeland Security Council within the Executive 
Office of the President to advise the president of homeland security matters.  Section 
1111 states that the Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, and Tobacco is to be transferred to the 
Department of Justice and Title XIV requires that the Transportation Security 
Administration develop a plan to arm pilots.  Additionally, section 1503 requires 
Congress to review its committee structure and possibly reorganize to create permanent 
committees on Homeland Security.  
Nuclear terrorism is only referenced briefly in this bill that was intended to 
redefine homeland security.  More importantly, the law only discusses the response to a 
nuclear event, not the prevention or deterrence of the event itself.  Nuclear terrorism is 
first discussed under Title V, which is Emergency Preparedness and Response.  Section 
501 discusses the creation of the Directorate of Emergency Preparedness, which is to be 
headed by the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response.  Section 502 
outlines the responsibilities of the directorate and the Under Secretary.  It states that the 
Under Secretary should help ensure the effectiveness of emergency response to terrorist 
attacks.  As with other sections of the bill, it is vaguely defined, and offers little guidance. 
Section 502-2 outlines the duties of the Nuclear Incident Response Team.  The team 
duties include establishing standards and certifying that those standards have been met, 
conducting joint and other exercises to evaluate training and performance, as well as 
providing funds to the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency 
as deemed appropriate for planning exercises, training, and equipment.  Furthermore, the 
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Nuclear Incident Response Team would be responsible for overseeing the Metropolitan 
Medical Response System and coordinating other federal resources in the event of a 
terrorist attack or a disaster. Once again, the text of the bill provides little direction and is 
left intentionally vague.   
Section 504 specifically deals with the response to a nuclear attack or incident.  
The section is entitled Nuclear Incident Response and outlines briefly the types of 
agencies and responses that should occur after the detonation of a nuclear device.  Once 
again the Nuclear Incident Response Team is discussed.  It will operate under the 
direction of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and be an 
organizational unit of the DHS.  The team, as is mentioned in Section 504-b, will be 
organized by primarily using the entities found within the Department of Energy and the 
Environmental Protection Agency.  Section 506 offers a definition of the Nuclear 
Incident Response Team, while Section 508 discusses the use of the national private 
sector networks, by the Secretary, in emergency response.  In short, this section states 
that the Secretary should use private sector networks in response to a nuclear, chemical, 
biological or radiological attack whenever possible.  
Further discussion of nuclear terrorism found within the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 is found in Title VIII, which is entitled Coordination with Non-Federal Entities, 
Inspector General, United States Secret Service, Coast Guard, General Provisions.  
Section 852, entitled Procurements for Defense or Recovery from Terrorism or Nuclear, 
Biological, Chemical, or Radiological Attack, outlines briefly the type of response that 
should occur after the detonation of a nuclear device.  Finally, Section 858 requires that 
the heads of departments “identify new entrants into the federal marketplace” by 
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conducting market research for the purpose of identifying new or existing organizations 
that would further enhance the defense against, or the response to, an attack involving 
nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons.  This section is the only section 
dealing with nuclear weapons that directly addresses the defense against an attack. 
However, the reference is also vague in nature. 
As is clear with the excerpts from the original text of the bill, little, if anything, 
has been done to put into place measures that would help to deter or prevent a nuclear 
attack. The Homeland Security Act establishes a massive bureaucracy by moving all or 
parts of twenty-two federal agencies, with approximately 180,000 personnel, under the 
DHS, with little thought of organizational biases or jurisdictional disputes.  
The text in the bill deals more specifically with the response to an attack or event rather 
than the prevention of an attack involving nuclear weapons. It appears that the one of the 
main focuses of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 is the response to a terrorist attack or 
event. However, the language of the bill describing emergency preparedness and 
response to a terrorist incident is extremely vague.  The bill addresses only response 
capabilities to such a nuclear attack leaving detection, deterrence, and protection only 
mildly addressed. 
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Project BioShield Act 
 
The purpose of the Project BioShield Act is to amend the Public Health Service 
Act to provide protection and countermeasures against chemical, biological, radiological, 
and nuclear agents that may be used in a terrorist attack against the United States.  The 
bill was introduced in the Senate as S 15, which was passed in May 19, 2004.121  The 
House cleared the bill on July 14, 2004, and the President signed the bill into law on July 
21, 2004.122
The law has several key provisions, such as increasing the strategic stockpile.  
Section 510 authorizes $5.6 billion from FY2004 through FY2013 to purchase 
bioterrorism countermeasures for the Strategic National Stockpile.  Section 319F also 
increases research and development initiatives for the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS).  This section allows HHS to use expedited procedures for approving 
grants for research and development of countermeasures for use against chemical, 
biological, nuclear, and radiological agents.  In addition, HHS is given the authority to 
distribute drugs and treatments that are not yet approved by the FDA in the event of a 
national emergency involving chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological agents.   
The law makes several specific references to nuclear agents that may result due to 
an act of nuclear terrorism.  Section 319F-1 entitled Authority for use of Procedures 
Regarding Qualified Countermeasure Research and Development Activities deals with 
the jurisdictional duties of the various federal, state and local agencies.  However, the law 
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specifically states that the agency must treat, identify, or prevent harm from any 
biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent that may cause a public health 
emergency affecting national security.  This section goes on to outline the coordination 
with federal, state, and local agencies.  A subsection of Section 319F-1 outlines 
additional authority regarding the procurement of certain biomedical countermeasures 
and the availability of a special reserve fund.  This subsection gives additional authority 
to the secretary than what is granted by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to treat, 
identify, or prevent harm from any biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent 
identified as a material threat.   
In addition Section 319F-2, entitled Determination of Material Threats requires 
that the DHS Secretary assess current and emergent threats of biological, chemical, 
radiological, or nuclear agents and determine which of these agents present a material 
risk against the United States.  Furthermore, in the assessment and determination process, 
the secretary of the DHS is required to use all relevant information to which he or she is 
entitled, meaning that it should be an all source investigation.  Additionally, all relevant 
information should be used regardless of its level of classification, as relating to threats of 
biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agents. 
Section 319F makes reference to additional countermeasures in the subsection 
entitled Subsequent Specific Countermeasures.  This section describes the procurement of 
a security countermeasure.  It states that a countermeasure is appropriate for inclusion in 
the stockpile if it provides improved safety and effectiveness to enhance preparedness or 
to respond to a threat associated with biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear 
agents. 
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Section 510, entitled Procurement of Security Countermeasures for the Strategic 
National Stockpile makes reference to and describes threat assessment capabilities.  
Subsection D-1 discusses terror threat assessment under the Security Countermeasures 
Program.  This subsection allocates funds for the necessary analysis capabilities required 
to collect and disseminate intelligence for biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear 
threat assessment.  Section 564, entitled Authorization for Medical Products for use in 
Emergencies, deals with emergency uses, product approval, as well as definitions in the 
declaration of an emergency.  An emergency is defined as a domestic, military, or 
national security situation, depending on the circumstances.  In order to declare an 
emergency, an attack must occur or a heightened risk of attack involving chemical, 
biological, radiological, or nuclear agents must be present.  
 The Project BioShield Act offers some guidance on threat analysis; however, its 
primary focus is on the detection of an attack and the recovery from such an attack. A 
section 319F deal specifically with jurisdiction issues only after an attack has occurred, 
and discusses the agencies that should respond to that particular type of an attack.  
Section 319F-2 makes progress in addressing emerging threats; however, it does not 
make reference to measures that could be used or implemented to deter or prevent an act 
of nuclear terrorism.  Again, like in the other instances, this law deals with the response 
to a nuclear attack, not the prevention of the attack itself.  The Project BioShield Act is 
reactive rather than proactive. 
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Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
 
The failures of the intelligence agencies to discover the impending attack on the 
United States on September 11, 2001 prompted Congress to seek answers.  The 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was the largest reorganization of the 
intelligence community since World War II. Congressional action was ultimately 
determined by the recommendations that were made by the 9/11 Commission.123  The 
House introduced HR 10, but would later adopt the conference report.124  The final bill 
included many provisions that dealt with more than just intelligence.  The House and 
Senate would clear the bill and the President signed it into law on December 17, 2004.125  
The intelligence reform bill is wide ranging.  It contains provisions that deal with 
the national intelligence director, transportation security, border security and 
immigration, information sharing, improvement of analysis and coordination, civil 
liberties, and many other intelligence changes.  Section 1001, subtitle A establishes the 
position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to serve as the head of the entire 
U.S. intelligence community.  The DNI is to be appointed by the President and confirmed 
by the Senate.  Section 1011 charges the DNI with ensuring that all federal departments 
and agencies, the Joint Chiefs, and the relevant committees in Congress have access to 
crucial intelligence to carry out their day to day missions.  The DNI also assumes the role 
of monitoring the implementation of intelligence operations.  Section 1096 authorizes a 
staff of up to 500 individuals to operate the DNI office.  Additionally, the law requires 
that the DNI create a vast intelligence network in order to share information from agency 
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to agency through uniform procedures, technology standards, and polices of information 
sharing.126   
In order to improve analysis and coordination of intelligence, section 103 requires 
the creation of the National Intelligence Council, which is also tasked with the creation of 
National Intelligence Estimates.  Section 1022 establishes the National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCC), which is in the office of the DNI, and is responsible for analyzing, as well 
as integrating intelligence on international terrorism and counterterrorism.  The NCC will 
also absorb the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).  In addition, the law also 
suggests the establishment of the National Counter-proliferation Center, which is to be 
created by the President, and would serve as the primary organization within the 
government for analyzing and integrating intelligence dealing with the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.  Other changes were made under subtitle E that concern 
education, training, civil liberties, and open source intelligence. 
Title IV, entitled Transportation Security, deals with transportation security 
issues. Section 4001 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a national 
strategy for transportation security, as well as a damage recovery plan after the 
occurrence of an attack.  In addition, section 4012 requires that the DHS begin to deploy 
biometric technology and requires that the Transportation Security Administration 
implement an advanced screening system that runs suspect names through “no fly” lists 
as well as the integrated terrorist watch list simultaneously.  The law also requires 
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increased employee screening, more thorough baggage screening, the use of air marshals, 
and improved maritime security.127  
The section of the law that addresses border security and immigration is directly 
related to the recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission.128  Section 5202 
authorized the DHS to add 2,000 full time border patrol agents each year until 2010 or 
totaling approximately 14,000 new hires.  Furthermore, section 7203 requires that all visa 
applicants be interviewed in person by a U.S. consular official.  In addition, section 7202 
created a Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center with the sole mission of reducing 
terrorist entries into the United States, while addressing human smuggling as well.  
Additionally, section 7203 adds approximately 150 new consular officers. Section 7205 
suggests better agreements should be made with foreign nations concerning fraudulent 
travel documents. While section 7206 introduces the Immigration Security Initiative and 
section 7220 implements higher levels of identification standards.  
Nuclear terrorism is only referenced briefly in the Intelligence Reform Act.  The 
threat of nuclear terrorism is first discussed under Subtitle C, Air Cargo Security.  Section 
4054, entitled Report on International Cargo Threats, requires that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator 
of the Federal Aviation Administration, prepare a report for several committees in the 
House and the Senate.  The report must contain a description of the current procedures in 
place that address the threat of an inbound, all-cargo aircraft from outside the United 
States that intelligence sources indicate could carry an explosive, incendiary, chemical, 
biological, or nuclear device.  In addition, the report must contain an analysis of the 
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potential for establishing secure facilities along established international aviation routes 
for the purposes of diverting and securing aircraft that may contain hazardous cargo.  
Section 6803, entitled The Participation in Nuclear and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Threats to the United States, found under Subtitle I, entitled the Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Prohibition Improvement Act of 2004, amends several lines in the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.  The individual must willfully participate in or knowingly 
provide material support or resources to a nuclear weapons program of a foreign terrorist 
power or attempt to do so.129 This also applies to other weapons of mass destruction 
programs.130  In addition, whomever, without lawful authority, develops, possesses, 
attempts or conspires to develop or possess a radiological weapon, threatens the use of or 
uses the weapon against any person within the United States will be prosecuted to the 
fullest extent of the law.   
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 makes limited 
recommendations to prevent or deter a terrorist act involving a nuclear weapon or device.  
However, the act does require officials in the Department of Homeland Security, the 
Department of Defense, and the Federal Aviation Administration to compile a report 
within 180 days of the enactment of this legislation to asses the situation involving 
nuclear terrorism.  While there is a specific request for the report, the text describes the 
criteria of the report vaguely.  Furthermore, even if the report is written, there are not any 
penalties listed if the report is late and there is no guarantee that action will be taken to 
address the problems identified in the report.  It appears that one agency is simply 
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“passing the buck” to another.  Section 6803 goes through great lengths to define the 
participation in threats involving nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass 
destruction. However, it does nothing to prevent or deter a nuclear attack.  This section 
deals more with the definitions of offenses that are needed for the prosecution of 
individuals planning or executing an attack with such weapons, rather than addressing the 
need for measures to prevent or deter an attack.  
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IX. Findings 
 
As is demonstrated with the various summaries and analyses of the eight public 
laws that were identified and examined for this research, there were no significant 
measures adopted to deter or prevent an act of nuclear terrorism. The USA Patriot Act of 
2001 makes sufficient progress towards criminal investigation of crimes related to 
terrorism, money laundering issues, and other homeland security issues, but does little to 
prevent or deter an act of nuclear terrorism.  The Aviation and Transportation Security 
Act of 2001 takes great strides to secure civil aviation in the United States through 
federalization.  However, the law does not address any concerns involving nuclear 
terrorism directly.  While the measures that the law has introduced are effective in other 
areas of homeland security, they do little to directly deter or prevent acts of terrorism 
involving nuclear weapons and materials.  
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 
2002 primarily deals with measures that respond to attacks involving biological and 
chemical agents.  The law does contain provisions that address the response to a nuclear 
attack or incident.  However, the law does not contain any provisions that would prevent 
or deter an act of nuclear terrorism. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry 
Reform Act of 2002 incorporates moderate measures of prevention and deterrence for 
nuclear terrorism.  However, the law does not make a direct reference regarding nuclear 
terrorism. But the procedures, and funding that it implements will undoubtedly contribute 
to the United States’ homeland security efforts. 
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The Port Security Act of 2002 makes marginal progress in defending the United 
States from a terrorist attack originating in one of its 361 seaports.  The provisions found 
within the law are along the right track.  However, more measures need to be added or 
incorporated to adequately defend against an attack involving nuclear weapons. While the 
law increases port defenses at a marginal level, it does little to prevent or deter an act of 
nuclear terrorism.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 initiates the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security.  The agency that the law creates was comprised of 22 
federal agencies and 180,000 personnel. While law addresses the need for a central 
agency to handle homeland security issues, it has a broad focus.  The law does not 
specifically address the deterrence or prevention of an attack involving nuclear weapons, 
but it does make reference and recommendations to the response of this type of attack.  
The project BioShield Act of 2004 makes limited progress in the defense, 
deterrence, prevention of, and response to an attack involving nuclear weapons. This law 
primarily focuses on the detection of an attack, and the response to that particular attack. 
While the law makes minimal reference to detecting emerging threats, it does not 
specifically and adequately address the prevention or deterrence of a nuclear attack.  The 
law does deal with the response capabilities and duties to a nuclear attack. 
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 was introduced, 
for the most part, because the 9/11 Commission made many recommendations to policy 
makers about revamping the intelligence community. The law does not make any specific 
recommendations or references that would deter or prevent an act of nuclear terrorism. 
However, the legislation recommends that the National Counter Proliferation Center be 
created to deal with nuclear proliferation based issues. The center is responsible for the 
 
 78
dissemination of intelligence related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
Of the many public laws that were examined in this research, the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act is the only law that specifically calls for the creation of a center 
to focus solely on nuclear proliferation.  However, the center is still in its infancy; it was 
established on December 21, 2005.  The effectiveness of this center cannot yet be 
determined.   
The public laws were systematically analyzed to determine if they were 
appropriate, reasonable, and relevant to threat of nuclear terrorism based on three 
separate factors. These factors included prevention and deterrence, protection, and 
response. Other unintended benefits were also taken into consideration. Table 1 shows a 
summary of the findings described above. 
Table 1 
Public Law Deterrence Protection Response 
Other 
Benefits 
USA Patriot Act minimal moderate good some 
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act minimal minimal moderate yes 
Public Health Security & Bioterrorism Preparedness & 
Response Act none none moderate some 
Enhanced Border Security & Visa Entry Reform Act moderate minimal minimal yes 
Port Security Act minimal minimal minimal some 
Homeland Security Act minimal minimal moderate yes 
Project BioShield Act none moderate moderate some 
Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act moderate moderate minimal yes 
Note: This table uses a scale from none to excellent, with excellent representing the highest score. 
 
The public policy response to 9/11 can best be characterized as reactive rather 
than proactive. Policy is considered to be reactive directly following the attacks, meaning 
that it focuses primarily on vulnerability reduction. An excellent example of this type of 
policy and approach is the manner in which the United States attempted to secure its civil 
aviation directly following 9/11. The policy was reactive, not proactive, because it was in 
 
 79
response to an attack that had already occurred. The evidence suggests that policies were 
not being implemented or introduced due to risk based analysis.  It was not until recently, 
when Secretary Michael Chertoff took the helm at the Department of Homeland Security 
that the agency, and subsequently its policy, began to take more of a risk based 
approach.131  A risk based approach would allow the United States to take a more 
proactive approach in dealing with counterterrorism. Again, this evidence suggests that 
the United States is not adequately addressing its counterterrorism vulnerabilities.  
Analysis of The Aviation Transportation Security Act of 2001 indicates that the 
Congress attempted to secure civil aviation through federalization.  The law was reactive 
because it addressed only the vulnerabilities that were revealed on September 11, 2001 
and lacked a forward looking mission. It focused solely on addressing the vulnerabilities 
at present, but did little for long term planning.  The law requires that baggage and 
passenger screening be done and supervised by federal employees.  In addition, other key 
provisions of the law address the hardening of cockpit doors, air marshals, and more 
adequate flight crew training.  These provisions address the means that the September 11 
hijackers used to bypass aviation security, smuggle weapons onto aircraft, over power the 
crew, and finally take over the aircraft.  The law does not adequately address other issues 
involving aviation security.  Furthermore, the law was essentially designed to counter 
similar tactics as were used on September 11, 2001.  The law does not address other 
tactics used by terrorist organizations. 
 The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 also is 
reactive rather than proactive in nature.  Once again, this law addresses many of the 
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tactics that the 9/11 hijackers used to gain access into the United States.  The act was a 
response to the weaknesses that were identified in the immigration system as a result of 
the United States government’s self study following September 11, 2001.  The Enhanced 
Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 does not incorporate a forward 
looking strategy.  
 In addition to the specific references to the Aviation Transportation Security Act 
of 2001 and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, each of 
the laws that were analyzed contain measures to respond to various types of terrorist 
attacks.  Many laws do not incorporate any preventive measures that would serve as 
deterrence to an attack.  This is another example of how the laws are reflective of a 
reactive approach.   
Currently, a public law does not exist with the sole purpose of securing air cargo. 
While the most likely method of transport for nuclear materials or weapons is in 
containerized cargo or cargo transported in container on ships, air cargo or cargo 
transported by aircraft still presents a significant risk.  In addition, the need for a bill that 
addresses air cargo security further supports the assertion that the homeland security 
policy is reactive rather than proactive.  In the months following 9/11, the United States 
government took every conceivable step to secure civil aviation through passenger and 
baggage screening. However, even though every passenger and bag is screened before 
boarding the aircraft, the tens of thousands of tons of cargo traveling in the bellies of 
commercial aircraft are not screened.  
 Some members of Congress perceive air cargo security to be a legitimate risk to 
aviation, as well as U.S. national security. They have introduced bills into the House and 
 
 81
the Senate to address the issues surrounding air cargo security, but the bills were 
stagnating in both chambers.  S.165 was passed by voice vote on May 8, 2003, but was 
cleared when the session of Congress ended.  The bill never became a law.  In addition, 
HR 1103 was introduced by Representative Adam Schiff from California on March 5, 
2003 and was referred to the Aviation Subcommittee on March 6, 2003. HR 1103 was 
also cleared when the session of Congress ended. 
 These bills had provisions that would increase TSA inspection of all air shipping 
facilities, freight forwarders, couriers, and other companies that arrange and consolidate 
freight shipping.132  Furthermore, the bill instructs the TSA to establish an industry wide 
database of cargo shippers, creates a security training program for air cargo handlers, 
requires shippers to have a TSA security plan in place, and permits pilots to carry 
firearms. 133  While each of these provisions would contribute to air cargo security, much 
more remains to be done.  The bills for air cargo security have all failed and the United 
States’ need for increased levels of air cargo security have not been met. 
The public policy response to 9/11 adds layers to the government bureaucracy, 
thus further complicating matters.  The two most prevalent examples of this unintentional 
consequence are the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 incorporated all 
or parts of twenty-two federal agencies that were divided into four directorates: 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Science and Technology, Border and 
Transportation Security, and Emergency Preparedness and Response.  These directorates 
house more than 180,000 personnel.  As was evident with the Hurricane Katrina 
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response, jurisdictional uncertainties plagued federal organizations such as DHS and 
FEMA, in addition to state and local governments.  These issues delayed response time, 
thus costing lives.  The large size of the agencies, as well as the bureaucratic process, 
slows down decision making capabilities, and the response time to events or attacks.  
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 also adds layers 
of bureaucracy to the intelligence community. The law fails to change some of the 
fundamental flaws found within the intelligence community. This law attempts to 
separate the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) from one particular agency, which it 
does, but does not give the DNI sufficient power and clout to administer many of the 
changes that the Intelligence Reform Act suggests or implements. Without a strong DNI 
with budget authority, the DNI is likely to be ineffective.  
Furthermore, this law establishes centers that will also be used to help circumvent 
the stovepipe problem. A stovepipe problem is comprised of two things. First, it is when 
intelligence gathering has an end-to-end process from collection to dissemination through 
all disciplines.  Second, the collection disciplines are separate from each other and are 
often in competition.  However, these centers have their own limitations and are also 
likely to develop organization biases, which is another issue plaguing the intelligence 
community. As was the case with the other measures that the law suggests, these 
measures are only going to be as effective as the DNI who enforces or implements them. 
The law proposes or employs many measures that would be effective to better organize 
the United States intelligence community, but the law does not give the necessary power 
and authority to the DNI in order to manage all the changes.  As a result, the new law 
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only adds another layer of the bureaucracy to further complicate and exacerbate 
intelligence problems.    
Weak or marginal security practices still exist along the nation’s borders, and in 
the nation’s ports.  The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002 made 
much needed improvements in border security, but the law did address many other 
prevalent issues.  The law focused primarily on revamping the immigration system.  It 
addressed concerns that unwanted individuals would be able to enter the country using 
fraudulent travel documents and did nothing to focus on the larger percentage of 
immigrants and illegal aliens entering the United States without any type of travel 
documents. The bill authorized the hiring of 1000 new inspectors and 1000 new 
investigative personnel over a period of five years, in addition to $150 million in 
computer upgrades. While the bill did authorize additional personnel to monitor, track, 
and issue visas, it did not add additional personnel to the borders of the United States to 
enhance physical security elements. In other words, the law focused on fixing the visa 
problems identified by 9/11, but it did not address the thousands of illegal aliens crossing 
the borders. 
The Port Security Act of 2002 makes slightly better improvements to the various 
realms of port security.   Several of the key provisions in the law essentially bring the 
United States to a point in its security operations that should have been achieved before 
September 11, 2001.  However the law does not make the necessary adjustments or 
recommendations that are needed to take the United States to the next level of port 
security.  The current level of security was identified as a result of the investigations 
following 9/11.  The law requires that the Coast Guard do vulnerability assessments of 
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the nation’s 361 commercial seaports followed by a report on the vulnerabilities.  The 
law also increased funding and expedited the grant process for port security.  
Furthermore, the law appropriates $6 billion to the Coast Guard. As was the case with the 
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002, the Port Security Act of 2002 
only elevates the level of port security slightly. The law does not address the need for 
radiation detection equipment at many of the nation’s ports.  Additionally, the law does 
not call for higher levels of container inspection.  Furthermore, research has indicated the 
cost and the ease of implementation with the Department of Energy’s Mega Ports 
Initiative is also troubling. The most interesting portion of the law is the creation of 
security maritime safety and response teams.  These teams are tasked with the response to 
terrorist events, but the law does little to deter these types of tacks.  
The Nunn – Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which has been 
effective in dealing with Russian proliferation issues, has had its funding reduced in the 
years following September 11, 2001. Figure 1 shows the fiscal year funding trends for the 
Nunn-Lugar initiative.  Even with the elevated risk of attack involving nuclear weapons, 
funding for the program has been decreased since the year 2000.   The program receives 
less funding in the post 9/11 period, with elevated risk of nuclear attack, than it did 
during the pre 9/11 period.  
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Figure 1 – Source: Nunn-Lugar Report 
  
Technologically advanced screening capabilities used to detect radioactive or 
nuclear materials, either in ports at home or abroad, are costly and limited in scope.  
Furthermore, they are also contingent upon the foreign country’s willingness to cooperate 
with the United States with its Mega Ports Initiative (MPI).  According to the 
Government Accounting Office report 05-375, the Department of Energy’s MPI has had 
limited success in initiating work at ports identified as a high priority by its Maritime 
Prioritization Model because the Department of Energy has been unable to reach 
agreements with several key countries.134   In addition, the Department of Energy does 
not have a comprehensive long term plan for its Mega Ports Initiative.135  Furthermore, 
the Department of Energy has spent nearly $14 million on installing equipment at only 
two ports. The entire program, which calls for the instillation of technology at a total of 
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twenty ports by 2010, has a total estimated price tag of $337 million.136  However, this 
cost projection is uncertain for many reasons.  Furthermore this initiative is focused on 
ports and facilities abroad, but does little for domestic ports. In addition, the overall 
number of containers that are being screened is still far too little to serve as a creditable 
deterrent.  
A layered approach to homeland security should be adopted and better utilized in 
order to secure the United States from attacks involving nuclear weapons and materials.  
One of the first layers of security against nuclear weapons should be containment and the 
physical security of facilities that house nuclear weapons and materials.  This approach 
should be adopted both at home and abroad.  Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and the former 
Soviet Union pose the most serious threat. However, other states that possess nuclear 
weapons also pose a security risk.  The Nunn-Lugar Initiative’s funding should be 
increased so that the program can continue to contain or destroy large numbers of 
weapons of mass destruction for a relatively low cost compared to other programs and 
methods.  
The second layer of security against nuclear weapons should begin in the ports of 
countries abroad.  The most likely method of transportation for a nuclear weapon or 
nuclear material is through containerized cargo. An aggressive program, such as the 
Mega Port Initiative, is needed to install the necessary chemical, explosive, and nuclear 
detection equipment, as well as personnel at predetermined, high risk ports abroad.  This 
method will serve as a first line of defense against a nuclear attack.   It is important to 
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keep in mind that once a container carrying a nuclear weapon or nuclear material enters 
into one of the United States 361 domestic sea ports, the chance of a catastrophe is almost 
certain.  
The third layer of security against a nuclear attack should include the Coast 
Guard.  The primary task of the Coast Guard would be to stop and search high risk 
vessels well off the coast of the United States.  In order for this layer to be effective, the 
Coast Guard would have to be outfitted with the necessary portable, explosive, and 
nuclear detection equipment. This third layer would serve as a buffer between the foreign 
port of departure and the domestic port of arrival.  In addition to a large fleet of ships, 
well trained crews, and portable detection equipment, a solid maritime intelligence 
program would be necessary to identify threats.  
The fourth and final layer of adequate security measures to protect against an 
attack involving nuclear weapons would be placing highly trained personnel, as well as  
explosive, chemical, and nuclear weapons detection equipment at all of the nation’s 361 
domestic seaports. This fourth layer would serve as a last line of defense against a nuclear 
attack.  The purpose of this layer would be to identify and contain potentially hazardous 
cargo until the proper personnel could deactivate a weapon or properly dispose of the 
materials.  However, if a weapon was to arrive in one of the 361 domestic ports, an 
explosion of the device would be catastrophic.   
Each of these layers is required to have an adequate security against any harmful 
weapon that would be coming inbound to the United States through commercial shipping 
channels.  These approaches must be adequately funded above all.  Furthermore, great 
cooperation between the United States and foreign countries would be required in the 
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implementation of layer two. In addition, an intelligence program free of stovepipes and 
other inhibitive issues must support the missions of the agencies assigned to these tasks. 
It will require a multi-layered approach to adequately secure the United States from a 
nuclear attack, as well as any other type of attack.  
 
 89
X. Bibliography 
Bibliography 
Albright, David et al., “Bin Laden and the Bomb,” Institute for Science and International 
Security. Available at: 
http://www.isisonline.org/publications/terrorism/binladenandbomb.pdf  
 
Austin, Jan.  “CQ Almanac Plus 2004:  108th Congress-2nd Session (CQ Almanac).”  
Congressional Quarterly Books; 58th Edition.  Washington, D.C.  September 2005. 
 
Austin, Jan.  “CQ Almanac Plus 2003:  108th Congress 1st (CQ Almanac).”  
Congressional Quarterly Books; 58th Edition.  Washington, D.C.  September 2004. 
 
Austin, Jan.  “CQ 2002 Almanac Plus: 107th Congress.  2nd Session (CQ Almanac).” 
Congressional Quarterly Books; 58th Edition.  Washington, D.C. October 2003.   
 
Bea, Keith.  “The National Preparedness System:  Issues in the 109th Congress.”  
Congressional Research Service.  Washington, D.C.  2005.   
 
Bunn, Matthew. “Preventing a Nuclear 9-11,” Issues in Science and Technology, Winter 
2005. Available at: http://www.issues.org/issues/21.2/bunn.html. 
 
Bunn, Matthew. Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: A Progress Update. Accessed 1/20/06. 
Available at: http://www.nti.org/c_press/analysis_cnwmupdate_102203.pdf 
 
Bunn, Matthew. “The Demand for Black Market Fissile Material”. June 16, 2005. 
Available at: http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/threat/demand.asp#_ftnref12 
 
Bunn, Matthew & Weir, Anthony, “Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global 
Imperatives,” Managing the Atom Project, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat 
Initiative. Available at: www.nti.org/cnwm 
 
Carafano, James Ph.D. “Safeguarding America's Sovereignty: A "System of Systems" 
Approach to Border Security.”  The Heritage Foundation. November 28, 2005 Available 
at: http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg1898.cfm#_ftnref7 
 
Carson Mark et al., “Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?” in Paul Leventhal and 
Yonah Alexander, eds., Preventing Nuclear Terrorism. Lexington, MA: Lexington 
Books, 1987 
 
Combs, Cindy.  “Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century.”  Prentice Hall.  Upper Saddle 
River, NJ.  2003. 
 
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, Report to the President (Washington, D.C.: WMD Commission, 2005. 
 
 90
 
Daly, Sara et al. “Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor,” RAND Project 
Air Force, 2005. Available at: 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB458.sum.pdf. 
 
Department of Homeland Security.  National Planning Scenarios. March 2005. Available 
at: 
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/nationalsecurity/earlywarning/NationalPl
anningScenariosApril2005.pdf 
 
Department of Homeland Security.  “National Strategy for Homeland Security.”  
Washington, D.C.  July 2002.   
 
Department of Homeland Security.  “Performance and Accountability Report.  Fiscal 
Year 2004.”   Washington, D.C.  2004.   
 
Department of Homeland Security.  “Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies Report.”  
Washington, D.C.  2003.   
 
Department of Transportation. Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Accessed 1/22/06. 
Available at: http://www.bts.gov/ 
 
De Rugy, Veronica. “What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?” American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Washington, DC. 2004. 
 
Falkenrath, Richard A.  Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.  April 27, 2005. 
 
Falkenrath. Richard A. "The 9/11 Commission Report," International Security 29 (3), 
Winter 2004-2005, 170-190. 
 
Flynn, Stephen E.  “America the Vulnerable:  How our government is failing to protect 
us from Terrorism.”  Harper Collins Publishers. New York, New York. 2004. 
 
Flynn, Stephen E. “The Neglected Home Front.”  Foreign Affairs, September/October 
2004. 
 
General Accounting Office (GAO), Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia's 
Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed, GAO-01-312(Washington, 
DC: General Accounting Office, February 28, 2001) 
 
Government Accounting Office. GAO-05-375 –“Preventing Nuclear Smuggling”. March 
2005. Page 3. Available at:  http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05375.pdf 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/07/23/911.congress/index.html.  Accessed 
December 22, 2005.  
 
 
 91
Heyman, David.  “Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security.”  The Heritage 
Foundation.  Washington, D.C.  2004.   
 
International Atomic Energy Agency. “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards 
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General.” 
GOV/2004/83 (Vienna: IAEA, November 15, 2004). 
 
Jenkins, Brian Michael.  “Terrorism:  Current and Long Term Threats.”  RAND 
Corporation.  Santa Monica, CA.  2001 
 
Kean, Thomas.  “Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations.”  2005. 
 
Kean, Thomas.  “The 9/11 Commission Report.”  W.W. Norton & Company.  New York. 
2004. 
 
Kephart, Janice. “Immigration Benefits and Terrorism,” Center for Immigration Studies, 
September 2005. 
 
Mintz, John.  “US Called unprepared for Nuclear Terrorism.” Washington Post”  May 3, 
2005. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/05/02/AR2005050201454.html 
 
National Intelligence Council. “Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of 
Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces,” December 2004. Available at: 
http://www.cia.gov/nic/special_russiannuke04.html. 
 
Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Country Profile: North Korea” Accessed 1/20/06. Available 
at: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/index.html 
 
Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Country Profile: Pakistan” Accessed 1/20/06. Available at: 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/index.html 
 
Nunn-Lugar Report.  August 2005.  Available at: http://lugar.senate.gov/reports/Nunn-
Lugar_Report_2005.pdf 
 
Parachini, John V.  “Homeland Security.  A Compendium of Public and Private 
Organizations’ Policy Recommendations.”  RAND Corporation.  Santa Monica, CA.  
2003.   
 
Public Law 107-56, The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act Of 2001, 
which was signed into law on October 26, 2001. Available at: 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/publaw/107publ.html 
 
 
 92
Public Law 107-71, The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which was signed into 
law on November 19, 2001.  Available at: 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/publaw/107publ.html 
 
Public Law 107-188, Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act Of 2002, which was signed into law on June 12, 2002.Available at: 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/publaw/107publ.html 
 
Public Law 107-173, Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, 
which was signed into law on May 14, 2002. Available at: 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/publaw/107publ.html 
 
Public Law 107-295, The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, which was 
singed into law on November 25, 2002. Available at: 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/publaw/107publ.html 
 
Public Law 107-296, The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which was singed into law on 
November 25, 2002. Available at: http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/publaw/107publ.html 
 
Public Law 108-276, the Project BioShield Act of 2004, which was signed into law on 
July 21, 2004. Available at: http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/publaw/108publ.html 
 
Public Law 108-458, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 
which was signed into law on December 17, 2004. Available at: 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/publaw/108publ.html 
 
Restricted Data Declassification Decisions From 1946 To the Present, RDD-7 
(Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy, January 1, 2001), MPC&A Program 
Strategic Plan (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy, July 2001). 
 
Steven, Graeme C.S. and Rohan Gunaratna.  “Counterterrorism.”  ABC CLIO.  Santa 
Barbara, CA.  2004.   
 
“The 9/11 Commission Report.”  W.W. Norton & Company.  New York. 2004.  
 
“The Gilmore Commission Final Report.”  Washington, DC. 2003. 
 
“The Hart Rubman Commission Final Report.”  Washington, DC. 2001. 
 
The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, United States Department of Energy. “A 
Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia.” 
January 2001, available at http://www.stimson.org/ctr/?SN=CT20050720884  
 
Waters, Mike.  “Federal Funding for Homeland Security:  An Update.”  Congressional 
Budget Office.  Washington, D.C.  2005.   
 
 
 93
Wier, Anthony & Bunn, Matthew. “Introduction: Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling,” last 
updated August 2002, available as of October 20, 2003, at 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/interdicting/index.asp. 
Willis, Henry. “Analyzing Terrorism Risk.” RAND Corporation. Santa Monica, CA. 
2005. 
 
Wormuth, Christine.  “Homeland Security Risk Assessments:  Key Issues and 
Challenges.”  Center for Strategic and International Studies.  Washington, D.C.  2005.   
 
Venzke, Ben N.  “Al-Qaeda Tactic / Target Brief.” Tempset Publishing. Alexandria, VA. 
2002. 
 
 
 
 
